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Identical letters dated 10 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the "First Quarterly Report (January-March 2015) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the Human Rights Situation in the Russian-occupied Regions of Georgia", which was published on 1 June 2015 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations

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Annex to the identical letters dated 10 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

First Quarterly Report (January-March 2015) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia

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1. Introduction

1.1 Aims of the Report and Methodology Applied

This report is prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. It is the first quarterly report, covering the period of January-March 2015 and aiming at assessing the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will continue the preparation of such reports on a quarterly basis. This reporting exercise aims to contribute to the provision of regular and updated information to the international community, to states as well as to international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.

As for the applied methodology, this reporting exercise consolidates and assesses existing information from various open sources, national and international, on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia. Due to limitations on its length, the report does not aim to collect/contain information on all cases of violations of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia; it aims to consolidate and assess only some of the most known examples of violations. The methodology applied does not provide for the conduct of fact-finding visits to the occupied regions of Georgia, nor to the conduct of interviews. Therefore the methodology applied does not enable this reporting exercise to collect and produce new data on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.

1.2 Occupation of Regions of Georgia and Responsibility of the Occupying Power for Human Rights Violations

As a result of military aggression, creeping annexation and occupation policy, well-planned and systematically implemented by the Russian Federation regarding the territory of Georgia, between 1991 and 2015 several hundreds of thousands of persons were expelled from their homes to become IDPs and refugees and they have been deprived of their internationally recognized right to a voluntary, safe and dignified return to places of their permanent residence.[1] Currently, the territories of two regions of Georgia — Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation as the occupying power, exercises effective control over these territories. The occupation of regions

[1] Namely, as a result of the ethnic cleansings of 1991-1993 and 1998, approximately 450 000 persons were expelled from places of their permanent residence: approximately 20 000 persons from the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia in 1991-1992; approximately 370 000 persons from Abkhazia, Georgia in 1992-1993; and approximately 60 000 from the Gali district Abkhazia, Georgia in 1998. In addition, as a result of ethnic cleansing during the 2008 August War and its aftermath, tens of thousands IDPs and refugees from the Akhalgori district and its adjacent areas, as well as Kodori Gorge/Upper Abkhazia were expelled from places of their permanent residence.

of Georgia by the Russian Federation has been recognized by the international community.[2] It should be noted with particular emphasis, that recently the Russian Federation signed the so called "Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership" with its occupation regime in Sokhumi and the so called "Treaty on Alliance and Integration" with its occupation regime in Tskhinvali: thus going well beyond its military occupation and laying ground for annexation[3] of Georgian territories.

Since the August War of 2008, the international community has been calling on the Russian Federation to bear responsibility for violations of human rights in the territories of Georgia which are under Russia's effective control.[4] The UN Human Rights Committee issued recommendations to the Russian Federation on the issue at its 97th (2009) and 113th (2015) sessions.[5]

According to the European Parliament, "whereas Russia [in 2014] continues to occupy the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, in violation of the fundamental norms and principles of international law; whereas ethnic cleansing and forcible demographic changes have taken place in the areas under the effective control of the occupying forces, which bear the responsibility for human rights violations in these areas, including violations of the rights to free movement, people-to-people contacts and education in one's native language."[6]

1.3 Occupation Line and Installation of Barbed Wire Fences

The occupation line along the administrative boundary line (ABL) with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region separates Georgia from its two occupied territories. The occupation line, established by the occupying power since the August War of 2008, prevents several hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees from returning to places of their permanent residence. The transfer of the control of the occupation line to the Russian FSB border guards puts further restrictions on ethnic Georgians:

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[2] For example, "Resolution on the Situation in Georgia" (2012), Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE PA), paragraphs 4 and 7; "European Parliament Resolution on the Conclusion of the Association Agreement with Georgia", 18 December 2014, European Parliament, paragraphs D and 11; "European Parliament Resolution on the Negotiations of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement", 17 November 2011, European Parliament, paragraph F; **Resolution 1633 (2008) "The consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia"**, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 6; Resolution 1647 (2009) "**Implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia**", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 16; Resolution 1648 (2009) "The Humanitarian Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraphs 6, 24.14 and 24.15; Resolution 1801 (2011) "On Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Georgia", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 22; Resolution 1916 (2013) "Georgia and Russia: the Humanitarian Situation in the Conflict and War-affected Areas", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 8.

[3] "European Parliament Resolution on the Conclusion of the Association Agreement with Georgia", 18 December 2014, European Parliament, paragraph 11.

[4] For example, Resolution 1647 (2009) "**Implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia**", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 7; "European Parliament Resolution on the Negotiations of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement", 17 November 2011, European Parliament, paragraph F.

[5] Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, 97th Session, 2009, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 pp. 5-6; Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, 113th Session, 2015, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, p. 2.

[6] "European Parliament Resolution on the Conclusion of the Association Agreement with Georgia", 18 December 2014, European Parliament, paragraph D.

Russia continues to place undue restrictions on the local population wishing to cross the occupation line[7] that often runs through their orchards, yards, grazing fields, agricultural plots and cemeteries. People are regularly detained by Russian FSB border guards for so called "illegal border crossings" while the operating crossing points along the occupation line allow crossings only to individuals having one of the types of "documents" recognized by the occupying power and based on vague criteria as to the validity of these documents.[8] Those unable to present those documents or show up at the crossing point out of working hours, are denied the right to cross, often leading to casualties among those locals, including children and women, seeking urgent medical treatment.

In the spring of 2011, the Russian occupation forces intensified the process of the installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the occupation lines in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (launched back in 2009). This process has been further intensified since January 2013 and is still ongoing. Currently, the total length of artificial barriers along the occupation line only in Tskhinvali Region is 51 km. In some segments, the barbed wire fence has intruded into territory controlled by the central government of Georgia, thus extending the area of occupation.

The installation of barbed wire fences and artificial obstacles significantly affects the everyday life of the local population; namely it divides families and communities and prevents people-to-people contact; blocks the access of the local population to their agricultural lands and to potable/irrigation water systems; it prevents the local population from visiting religious sites and from having an access to cemeteries; and, most alarmingly, blocks local residents from reaching the emergency medical services. Thus this process of the installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles by the Russian Federation violates human rights, including, but not limited to, the freedom of movement, the right to property, the right to family life, the right to education in the native language and other rights.[9] It should be noted that the installation of barbed wire fences along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia, had a direct impact on 200 local families and some were compelled to flee, thus creating a further wave of IDPs. It should be emphasized that the international community condemned the process of the illegal installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the lines of occupation.[10]

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[7] Resolution 1683 (2009) "The War between Georgia and Russia: One Year After", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraphs 5 and 7.

[8] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (November 2014-March 2015), 22 April 2015, SG/Inf (2015) 18, paragraph 44.

[9] Decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, "The Council of Europe and the conflict in Georgia" 1198th meeting — 29-30 April and 2 May 2014, paragraph 3.

[10] "Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the placement of obstacles along administrative boundary lines in Georgia", 1 October 2013 (131001/02): "Pillay praises Georgia's plan to introduce comprehensive human rights reforms, Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, at a press conference in Tbilisi." Georgia, 21 May 2014, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14624#sthash.OkwTyUpY.dpuf; "State of Democracy, Human Rights and Rule of Law in Europe", Report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 124th Session of the Committee of Ministers, 4-5 May 2014, p. 56; "EUMM: Recent installation of fences near Ditsi is unacceptable", 28.05.2013; "EUMM voices concern about the impact of fences on local communities", 02.08.2013; "EUMM notes resumption of fencing activities", 29.11.2013; "EUMM: Recent installation of fences near Ditsi is unacceptable", 28.05.2013; "EUMM voices concern about the impact of fences on local communities", 02.08.2013; "EUMM notes resumption of fencing activities", 29.11.2013.

1.4 Occupied Territories as "Black Holes" of the Human Rights Protection Mechanisms

Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navy Pillay, assessed Georgia's occupied territory of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region as a "black hole" and "one of the most inaccessible places on earth"; she noted that very little is known about what is happening in this area and "more attention needs to be paid to the situation of human rights in South Ossetia and Abkhazia."[11] Notably, the High Commissioner, similarly to other representatives of international organizations, was denied access to the occupied region. It is noteworthy that "the Assembly [PACE] considers it unacceptable that persons residing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should not be effectively covered by the human rights protection mechanisms granted to them as citizens of a Council of Europe member state under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as other relevant Council of Europe conventions, as a result of the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. Such a human rights protection black hole should not be allowed to exist within the Council of Europe area."[12]

These two regions still remaining under foreign military occupation, constitute above all dangerous black holes in verifying human rights violations and holding the violators accountable. Protection of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia remains a challenge not only for the government of Georgia but also for the international community. For years, the Georgian authorities have been trying to involve international organizations in the issue of the protection of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia. The Georgian government keeps on emphasizing the significance of the access of international human rights monitoring mechanisms in Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia.[13] It is deplorable that the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is prevented from monitoring inside the occupied regions, as provided by the mandate. The occupying power, exercising effective control, has been preventing numerous international organizations, including humanitarian,[14] from entering those territories: this represents yet another blatant attempt to conceal grave human rights violations which systematically occur in this area.

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[11] "Pillay praises Georgia's plan to introduce comprehensive human rights reforms, Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, at a press conference in Tbilisi." Georgia, 21 May 2014, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14624#sthash.OkwTyUpY.dpuf.

[12] Resolution 1647 (2009) "**Implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia**", Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), paragraph 7.

[13] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (October 2013-March 2014), 22 April 2014, SG/Inf (2014) 17, paragraph 39.

[14] "Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia", OSCE/ODIHR, 27 November 2008, p. 72.

2.1 Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment

2.1 Introduction

During and after the August War of 2008, numerous cases have been reported from the occupied regions of Georgia of torture and ill-treatment.[15] The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe received numerous reports on cases of torture and ill-treatment from displaced persons.[16] It should be noted that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) noted the practice of ill-treatment and abuse during detention, as well as poor detention conditions, in occupied Abkhazia.[17] It should be also noted that in March 2015, Mr. Juan E. Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment visited Georgia, but was not allowed to the occupied regions of Georgia.

2.2 Current Situation

Numerous cases were noted during the reporting period[18] on violations of the right to freedom from torture and ill-treatment.[19] For example information available in the Georgian media and other open sources supply the following: on 23rd January 2015, 3 schoolchildren from Gali district were detained by the Russian FSB officers along the occupation line. The 3 schoolchildren, all of them members of the same family, were going to school in the village of Tskoushi, in the Tsalenjikha district. The Russian FSB officers were drunk and ill-treated the three children while they were detained for about five hours;[20] on 29th January 2015, Russian soldiers entered with armoured vehicles the village of Achadara, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians, in the vicinity of Sokhumi. The Russian soldiers severely beat several residents of the village, including the 78 years old ethnic Armenian;[21] on 28th February 2015, 55 years old man from the Zugdidi District was kidnapped and

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[15] "Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia", OSCE/ODIHR, 27 November 2008, pp. 24-25, p. 36, p. 59, 74; "August Ruins", Report of the Georgian Non-Governmental Organizations on Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, August War, 2008, Tbilisi 2009, p. 40; "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 3 and 9.

[16] "Human Rights in Areas Affected by the South Ossetia Conflict. Special Mission to Georgia and Russian Federation", by Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Vladikavkaz, Tskhinvali, Gori, Tbilisi and Moscow, 22-29 August 2008), paragraph 10[9].

[17] Report on the visit to the region of Abkhazia, Georgia, carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 April to 4 May 2009.

[18] January-March 2015.

[19] See weekly press reviews on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015.

[20] See weekly press review (between 20 January and 25 January 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 15.

[21] See weekly press review (between 26 January and 2 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 6.

severely beaten by the Russian military. He was then transferred to the detention facility in the occupied territory of Abkhazia;[22] on 28th February 2015, a resident of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district was detained by the Russian FSB border guards for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district. The detainee attempted to escape from a Russian FSB officers, and as a result was severely beaten with the butt of an automatic rifle and was taken to *de facto* Abkhazia State Security office in Gali; on March 13th, 2015 a resident of the village of Tagiloni, Gali district was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" and was taken to *de facto* Abkhazia State Security office in Gali. During the detention the detainee was severely beaten by the Russian FSB officers; on March 14th, 2015 a resident of Anaklia town and a resident of village Tsaishi, Zugdidi district were detained by Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" reason in the area of the village of Orsantia, Gali district and were taken to *de facto* Abkhazia State Security office in Gali. During the detention both persons were severely beaten by the Russian FSB officers; on 26th March 2015, a man was detained in Gali district and severely beaten. Later he was transported to the Gali central hospital for the treatment;[23] on March 28th, 2015 a resident of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" reason in the area of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district and was taken to *de facto* Abkhazia State Security office in Gali. During the detention the detainee was severely beaten by the Russian FSB officers.

2.3 Conclusion

Therefore it can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia and examples provided for the reporting period[24] constitute infringements on freedom from torture and ill-treatment and therefore are violations of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.[25]

3. Arbitrary Detentions

3.1 Introduction

Since the August War of 2008, in the occupied regions of Georgia, cases of arbitrary detentions of ethnic Georgians are very common; in addition, the Russian FSB border guards regularly carry out arbitrary detentions for so called "illegal border

[22] See weekly press review (between 23 February and 28 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 6.

[23] See weekly press review (between 23 March and 29 March 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 12.

[24] January-March 2015.

[25] The Vienna Concluding Document (1989) prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Paragraph 23.4; The Paris Document (1990) also prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Istanbul Charter for European Security commits to "eradicating torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area". Paragraph 21.

crossing" along the occupation line.[26] The following number of arbitrary detentions took place by the Russian border guards in the years 2011-2014: 184 detainees in 2011; 301 detainees in 2012; 441 detainees in 2013; 307 detainees in 2014. Detentions along the occupation line are among the most serious problems faced by local communities on both sides of the occupation line for years.[27] In most cases detentions are followed by fines and later releases. It has been observed that the "detention period varies from several days up to several months or years without due access to procedural guarantees and right to fair trial."[28]

3.2 Current Situation

Numerous cases have been reported during the reporting period[29] on arbitrary detentions in the occupied regions.[30] Numerous sources suggest that arbitrary detentions took place during the reporting period with dire humanitarian consequences: for example, according to some leading Georgian NGOs, "While people on both sides continue to cross the ABL for various reasons, such as to access medical care, to visit graveyards, or to see relatives or family members on the other side, most of this movement across the ABL is considered illegal by the *de facto* authorities. Due to these restrictions on freedom of movement, Russian and Ossetian border guards mostly with alleged charge of 'illegal border crossing' have arrested residents of Georgian controlled territories, including women, minors and elderly people. Civilian inhabitants of the villages located alongside the ABL have been arrested by the Russian guards while harvesting the capers or cutting wood in close proximity to the ABL. International independent bodies have expressed their concern over the absence of official crossing points and regulations concerning the crossing of the ABL. The location of the ABL in many places is unclear. In some places the ABL is demarcated but in many places it is not."[31] And it has been stated

[26] Georgia's Human Rights Report for 2013, United States Department of State, p. 15, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220492.pdf; "Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia", OSCE/ODIHR, 27 November 2008, pp. 24-25, p. 25, pp. 37-38, 74; "August Ruins", Report of the Georgian Non-Governmental Organizations on Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, August War, 2008, Tbilisi 2009, p. 40; "Human Rights in Areas Affected by the South Ossetia Conflict. Special Mission to Georgia and Russian Federation", by Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Vladikavkaz, Tskhinvali, Gori, Tbilisi and Moscow, 22-29 August 2008), paragraph 94; "Pillay praises Georgia's plan to introduce comprehensive human rights reforms, Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, at a press conference in Tbilisi." Georgia, 21 May 2014, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14624#sthash.OkwTyUpY.dpuf.

[27] "Information Bulletin of Public Defender of Georgia: On Human Rights of Conflict Affected Population", Public Defender of Georgia, 2014, p. 4.

[28] "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 3.

[29] January-March 2015.

[30] See weekly press reviews on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015.

[31] "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 6.

by the Council of Europe that "[a]ccording to publicly available official Russian data, during the January-March 2015, more than 550 people were detained on "illegal border crossing" grounds. The practice of detentions and release after payment of fines continues to be enforced. It was also reported to the delegation that a more "heavy-handed" approach of Russian border guards had been observed in several detention cases linked to "unauthorised" crossings. The delegation was informed that local residents have recently become more apprehensive with regard to ABL crossings."[32] There are numerous cases of individuals subjected to arbitrary detentions. For example, information available in the Georgian media and other open sources suggest the following: on January 10th, 2015 the Russian FSB border guards conducted a special operation along the occupation line and detained ten residents of the Gali District for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district; on January 13th, 2015 the Russian FSB border guards conducted a special operation in the village of Meore Otobaia, Gali district, and detained seven residents of this area for so called "illegal border crossing"; on March 6th, 2015, two residents of the village of Akhali Burghulebi, Dusheti district were detained by Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Nagomevi, Akhalgori district. Both of the latter detainees were released on March 11 after paying a fine amounting to 4 000 rubles; on March 13th, 2015 a resident of the village of Zardiantkari, Gori district was detained by Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Khelchua, Tskhinvali district. The detainee was released on March 25 after paying a fine amounting to 2 000 rubles; on March 17th, 2015 a resident of Gori and a resident of Tbilisi were detained by Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Zemo Artsevi, Tskhinvali district. One detainee was released on March 21st after paying a fine amounting to 2 000 rubles. There are numerous cases of arbitrary detentions that are not linked to the so called "illegal border crossings", for example, information available in the Georgian media and other open sources suggest that on 17th February 2015 Russian militaries kidnapped 4 residents of the village Merkula, the Ochamchire district and demanded a ransom of USD 20 000 for each one from their families.[33]

3.3 Conclusion

Therefore it can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia and examples provided for the reporting period[34] constitute arbitrary detentions and therefore violations of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human

[32] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (November 2014-March 2015), 22 April 2015, SG/Inf (2015) 18, paragraph 45.

[33] See weekly press review (between 9 February and 16 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 7.

[34] January-March 2015.

Rights (UDHR); Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and of OSCE commitments.[35]

4. Freedom of Movement

4.1 Introduction

The crossing regime that was established by the occupying power along the occupation line in the aftermath of the August War of 2008 puts restrictions and limitations on freedom of movement for people living on both sides of the administrative boundary line (ABL) with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. Russian FSB border guards administering and controlling the occupation line prevent people, including hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees, from exercising their right to freedom of movement and freedom to choose their residence within the borders of the state. The Russian FSB border guards regularly detain individuals for the so called "illegal border crossings", including women, minors and elderly people.[36] The Russian FSB border guards place undue restrictions on the local population wishing to cross the occupation line;[37] operating crossing points, along the occupation lines, function in conjunction with the illegal and discriminatory rules and arbitrariness imposed by the Russian FSB border guards.

4.2 Current Situation

The situation described with regard to the freedom of movement continues and has remained unaltered between January and March 2015: numerous cases were reported during the reporting period[38] on violations of the right to freedom of movement and freedom to choose one's residence.[39] Numerous sources suggest violations of the freedom of movement during the reporting period. The erection of barbed wire fences has been described by some leaning Georgian NGOs as interfering with the freedom of movement of the population residing along the occupation line: "the fences constructed by Russian and *de facto* authorities are unjustifiable barriers to their freedom of movement within their property and

[35] The Vienna Concluding Document (1989) provides for ensuring that no one is subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Paragraph 23.1; According to the Moscow Document (1991) "no one will be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law". Paragraph 23.1 (i). prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Paragraph 23.4; The Paris Document (1990) also prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Istanbul Charter for European Security commits to "eradicating torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area". Paragraph 21.

[36] "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 3.

[37] "Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia", OSCE/ODIHR, 27 November 2008, p. 63; "Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence", International Crises Group, Europe Report No. 202 (2010), p. 4.

[38] January-March 2015.

[39] See weekly press reviews on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015.

elsewhere in the territory of Georgia, currently under Russian control."[40] And it has been argued by the Council of Europe that "[p]redictability and transparency of the crossing regime at the ABL continue to be hindered by the confusion surrounding the validity of documents used for crossing purposes. While the majority of people use an Abkhaz "passport", in some cases Forms N° 9 and old Soviet passports reportedly continue to be accepted. The period of validity of their use however remains unclear."[41] Information available in the Georgian media and other open sources report the following cases: on January 17th 2015, Russian FSB border guards detained 17 people for so called "illegal border crossing". All of them were heading to Gali district from the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. They were taken to the military base in the village of Otobaia, Gali district and fined;[42] on February 9th, 2015 two persons were detained at the occupation line while they were heading to the region of Abkhazia for hazelnut harvesting. Both were sentenced to four months imprisonment.[43] There are numerous cases of individuals not allowed to enter territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. For example, information available in the Georgian media and other open sources suggest the following: on February 26th, 2015 a resident of the village of Pirveli Gali, Gali district, who was in urgent need of medical attention, was trying to enter territory controlled by the central government. He was detained by the Russian FSB border guards for so called "illegal border crossing" in the area of the village of Nabakevi, Gali district. The detainee was taken to the Russian FSB border guards' base in the village of Nabakevi; however the person was released later due to worsened health; on March 12th, 2015 a parent and a child, residents of the village of Otobaia, Gali district, were not allowed to enter the territory controlled by the central government. The child, suffering from pneumonia, was in desperate need of medical attention; on March 17th, 2015 a parent and a child, residents of Gali district, were not allowed to enter the territory controlled by the central government. The child, having third-degree burns, needed urgent medical care.

4.3 Conclusion

Therefore it can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia and examples provided for the reporting period[44] constitute violations of the right to freedom of movement, namely of Article 12 of the International

[40] "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 6.

[41] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (November 2014-March 2015), 22 April 2015, SG/Inf (2015) 18, paragraph 44.

[42] See weekly press review (between 9 February and 16 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 2.

[43] See weekly press review (between 9 February and 16 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 3.

[44] January-March 2015.

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);[45] Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2, Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE freedom of movement commitments.[46] And limitations imposed by the Russian FSB border guards on freedom of movement and residence in the occupied regions of Georgia cannot be considered as permissible.[47]

It is of great significance to note that limitations on freedom of movement in the occupied regions of Georgia divides families and communities; blocks the access of the local population to their agricultural lands and potable/irrigation water systems; prevents the local population from visiting religious sites and from having access to cemeteries; restricts the right to education in the native language;[48] and most alarmingly, blocks local residents from reaching the emergency medical services.[49] Therefore it can be further concluded that limitations on freedom of movement in the occupied regions of Georgia violate the economic, social and cultural rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and relevant international instruments.

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[45] It should be emphasized that the Human Rights Committee, in Concluding Observations on Israel stated: " ... the Committee is concerned that the construction of the 'Seam Zone', by means of a fence and, in part, of a wall, beyond the Green Line, imposes additional and unjustifiably severe restrictions on the right to freedom of movement of, in particular, Palestinians within the Occupied Territories. The 'Seam Zone' has adverse repercussions on nearly all walks of Palestinian life; in particular, the wide ranging restrictions on freedom of movement disrupt access to health care, including emergency medical services, and access to water. The Committee considers that these restrictions are incompatible with article 12 of the Covenant. The State party should respect the right to freedom of movement guaranteed under article 12. The construction of a "Seam Zone" within the Occupied Territories should be stopped." (2003, UN doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, paragraph 19).

[46] According to paragraph 33 of the Moscow Document (1991), the OSCE participating States are obliged to remove all restrictions with regard to travel within the territory of a State and with regard to residence for those entitled to permanent residence within the territory of a State. And according to paragraph 20 of the Vienna Concluding Document (1989), the OSCE participating States are committed to secure the right of everyone to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State.

[47] For example, under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the ICCPR, the following measures could constitute permissible restrictions on the right under paragraph 1: traffic safety rules, restrictions on access to nature reserves, avalanche zones, quarantine zones, and prohibitions on unlicensed access to private property. (Joseph, S. Schultz J. and Castan, M. *The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 364). According to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2, Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR, any measure restricting the right in paragraph 1 must be lawful and pursue one of the legitimate aims listed and strike a fair balance between the public interest and the individual's rights. (*Riener v Bulgaria*, (App.46343/9), 23 May 2006, (2007) 45 EHRR 723, paragraph 109).

[48] It should be emphasized that in Gali district there are 31 schools and only in 11 schools the curricula is in the Georgian language. It is alarming that in these 11 schools, the teaching hours of the Georgian language and literature has been decreased from 10-10 hours to 6-6 hours, it means for 4-4 hours.

[49] It has been argued that socio-economic conditions of people residing in the vicinity of the occupation line is grave. For example, see "Information Bulletin of Public Defender of Georgia: On Human Rights of Conflict Affected Population", Public Defender of Georgia, 2014, pp. 5-7.

5. Right to Property

5.1 *Introduction*

The issue of homes and property lost during the conflicts in Georgia remains unsolved. For years, the right to property has been subject to systematic and gross violations in the occupied regions of Georgia; hundreds of houses of ethnic Georgian were burned/destroyed on purpose during and after the August War 2008.[50] It has been noted that "[c]ivilians seeking to cross the Administrative Boundary Line are continuing to be unlawfully detained. Their detention may last for several days, and they are only freed on payment of substantial fines, often simply for attempting to visit their own property on the other side of the wire to harvest their crops, including the valuable local delicacy known as jonjoli, which for many is their sole source of income."[51] For example, in the village of Zaardiaantkari, Gori district most of the houses were destroyed.[52]

5.2 *Current Situation*

The situation described with regard to the right to property has continued and remained the same between January and March 2015. Numerous sources suggest continuing violations of the rights to property during the reporting period:[53] for example, according to the report, which partially covers the reporting period, "the demarcation activities led to the loss of access to the family houses for several residents living adjacent to the administrative boundary line, in violation of their right to home and family life. E.g. the village residents of Dvani and Gugutiantkari have been denied access to the ancestral residences where they have deep family roots and emotional attachment. Even after the 2008 war they had been consistently trying to refurbish those houses that were damaged by the conflict and continued living there with their families. . . The newly constructed barbed wire fences also deprived hundreds of village residents in 24 villages from their sustenance — the land plots they cultivated for their living fell beyond the Russian marked borders. Security concerns, Russian and South Ossetian border guards and physical barriers make it impossible for village residents to cultivate the land plots or collect the harvest. . . There has not been any attempt from Russian or South Ossetian

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[50] "Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia", OSCE/ODIHR, 27 November 2008, pp. 24-25, pp. 26-28; p. 42; pp. 44-45, p. 61; "August Ruins", Report of the Georgian Non-Governmental Organizations on Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, August War, 2008, Tbilisi 2009, p. 28; "Human Rights in Areas Affected by the South Ossetia Conflict. Special Mission to Georgia and Russian Federation", by Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Vladikavkaz, Tskhinvali, Gori, Tbilisi and Moscow, 22-29 August 2008), paragraph 94; "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 4 and 9.

[51] "Pillay praises Georgia's plan to introduce comprehensive human rights reforms, Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, at a press conference in Tbilisi." Georgia, 21 May 2014, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14624#sthash.OkwTyUpY.dpuf.

[52] "Special Report of the Public Defender of Georgia on Human Rights in the Conflict Affected Region, Zardiaantkari: Consequences of War and the Burden of Existence", Public Defender of Georgia, December 2014.

[53] January-March 2015.

authorities to provide reparation for the population for the loss they sustained as a result of unlawful interference in their right to home and family life and lack of ability to cultivate their lands and collect harvest."[54] For example, in the village of Gugutiantkari, Gori district, the residents lost access to 50 per cent of their agricultural land plots since they are located now on the other side of the occupation line. There are numerous cases of violations of the right to property in the reporting period: for example, information available in the Georgian media and other open sources suggests that on January 20th 2015, in the village of Sida, Gali district, Russian militaries, together with the so called "Abkhazian Special Unit" representatives burned down houses of two ethnic Georgians. This incident took place on a background of shooting. On the same day, in the village of Refi, Gali district, Russian militaries, together with the so called "Abkhazian Special Unit" representatives burned down houses of other two ethnic Georgians.[55] On 23rd January 2015, the Russian militaries raided the villages of Gali district; the aim of the raid was to find out people who had crossed the occupation line to visit the town of Zugdidi. The Russian militaries completely confiscated winter reserve food products and mobile phones of "suspects" of the so called "illegal border crossings";[56] on 29 January 2015, Russian militaries entered with armoured vehicles the village of Achadara (mainly populated by ethnic Armenians) in the vicinity of Sokhumi. Russian militaries attacked 8 ethnic Armenian families and robbed them, namely they forcibly seized money, gold jewelry and food reserves.[57] On 3rd February 2015, Russian FSB border guards did not allow a resident of the village of Jariasheni, the Gori district to carry out agricultural works in his land property because of the erected barbed wires and banner with the text of "Republic of South Ossetia". Confiscation of nuts harvest — the only source of income for local peasants — is commonplace in Abkhazia region.

5.3 Conclusion

Therefore it can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia and examples provided for the reporting period[58] violate the right to property, namely Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 1, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.[59]

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[54] "Russia's Responsibility for Human Rights in Occupied Regions of Georgia" Submission from the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and Human Rights Priority for consideration at the 113th Session of the Human Rights Committee (16 March-2 April 2015) Russian Federation, p. 5; See GYLA's application at the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Mekarishvili and others v. Russian Federation (Application no. 31726/14).

[55] See weekly press review (between 20 January and 25 January 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, pp. 4-5.

[56] See weekly press review (between 20 January and 25 January 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 9.

[57] See weekly press review (between 26 January and 2 February 2015) on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, January-March 2015, p. 6.

[58] January-March 2015.

[59] The OSCE commitments impose obligation on states to ensure that everyone has the right to enjoy property and that no one may be deprived of properly except under conditions provided for by law. Moscow Document (1991), paragraph 24; Copenhagen Document (1990), paragraph 9.6.

6. Appeal to the International Community

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to the international community, states as well as international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations:

to continue recognizing extensively and widely the occupation of the territories of Georgia by the Russian Federation;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to bear responsibility for human rights violations on the occupied regions of Georgia;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to stop placing and remove barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the occupation line;

to take additional measures in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to allow a) access of the international human rights monitoring mechanisms to the occupied regions of Georgia; b) relevant missions of international organizations (e.g. EUMM), including humanitarian organizations, to the occupied regions of Georgia through legal routes;

to continue and intensify condemning violations of human rights such as freedom of movement; freedom from torture and ill-treatment; the right to liberty; and the right to property in the occupied regions of Georgia.

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The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/11 and Security Council resolution 2210 (2015), in which I was requested to report every three months on developments in Afghanistan.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since the issuance of my previous report, of 27 February 2015 (A/69/801-S/2015/151). It also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events related to Afghanistan.

II. Relevant developments

3. The appointment of all cabinet members brought the formation of the National Unity Government to near completion. With a cabinet all but in place, efforts were reinvigorated for advancing the reform agenda of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Implementation of socioeconomic policies remained a pressing concern, however, and additional appointments, including at the provincial level, were still pending. While the establishment of the Special Commission on Electoral Reform provided a mechanism for advancing towards the agreed goal of enhancing electoral integrity, the Commission has yet to start its work, and the electoral calendar has yet to be announced. Efforts by the Government continued with regard to commencing a process for peace and reconciliation, including the mobilization of backing by regional partners. Conflict-related violence increased as the Afghan National Security Forces sought to contain insurgent activity whose intensification resulted in record high levels of civilian casualties.

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A. Political developments

4. Since my previous report, the formation of the National Unity Government was completed, after the 16 ministerial nominations announced by President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah on 21 March were confirmed by the lower house of the National Assembly on 18 April, and President Ghani announced the nomination of a candidate for Minister of Defence on 23 May. Of the 24 ministers confirmed to date, four are women. Other important positions remain to be filled, including the Governor of the Central Bank, the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. On 25 April, the lower house of the National Assembly approved the appropriation of a budget for the Office of the Chief Executive and a Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, which had been created by presidential decree. On 26 April, Chief Executive Abdullah appointed the Head of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

5. On 7 April the President announced an initiative to establish a social contract between the Government and citizens of the country, in keeping with the reform agenda presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan. In the first meeting of the cabinet, on 23 April, President Ghani instructed ministers to formulate strategies for their first 100 days in office. On 26 May, at an extraordinary cabinet meeting, President Ghani announced the launch of those plans by the ministries. The President stated that the plans would be presented by each minister publicly in order to promote accountability and would be reviewed at the end of the period. He also stressed the importance of coordination by the ministries to improve service delivery.

6. On 27 April, the Office of the President announced the appointment of the Head of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, as well as the governors for Kandahar and Herat Provinces. As at 27 May, governors were appointed for 12 out of 34 provinces, leaving 22 provinces led by acting governors. Consistent with the ministerial appointments process, President Ghani excluded incumbents from reappointment.

7. From 22 to 25 March, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah visited Washington, D.C., where President Ghani met with the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama. In a joint statement issued on 24 March, they announced a new development partnership, in which up to $800 million in bilateral economic assistance would be earmarked for Afghan development and reform priorities; the United States would maintain its posture of 9,800 troops through the end of 2015; and the outcome of any Afghan-led peace process would include the Taliban and other armed opposition groups ending the violence, breaking ties with international terrorist groups and accepting Afghanistan's Constitution. On 26 March, I met with President Ghani and underlined the steadfast commitment of the United Nations to the development of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

8. In their 21 September 2014 agreement to establish a National Unity Government, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah agreed to undertake electoral reforms. Limited progress has been made in that regard. On 21 March, President Ghani issued a presidential decree establishing a 15-member Special Commission on Electoral Reform. A member of the lower house of the National Assembly was selected to lead the Commission. The process for fully institutionalizing the Commission remained unclear owing to ongoing discussions

between the offices of the President and the Chief Executive about the chairmanship and confirmation of its operational modalities.

9. According to the Constitution, Parliamentary elections should have taken place between 21 April and 21 May 2015. The current mandate of the lower house of the National Assembly expires on 22 June. On 1 April, the Second Vice-President, Mohammad Sarwar Danish, announced a delay of the Parliamentary elections until 2016, citing the need to allow time for the implementation of electoral reforms. Asserting that the mandate to announce and manage the electoral calendar rested solely with the Independent Election Commission, the Chair of the Commission, Ahmad Yousuf Nuristani, argued that postponing the vote was contrary to Afghan law and noted that proposals had been sent by the Commission to the Government on possible electoral dates. In the absence of an electoral calendar and concrete steps towards electoral reform, and citing the need for greater government funding of elections, international donors announced the scaling down of funding for the Afghan electoral institutions. As a result, the Independent Election Commission and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission began the process of reducing staff and assessing ways to lower monthly running costs, while seeking a supplementary budget through the Finance Ministry to maintain core capacities.

10. On 11 March, the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission released a final report on alleged fraud during the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections. As a result, 9,887 temporary Independent Election Commission staff members (out of a total 107,479) at 3,189 polling stations (out of a total of 22,778) were barred from re-employment by the Commission. In addition, three permanent Election Commission staff members were dismissed, as were eight permanent Complaints Commission staff members.

11. On 4 March, President Ghani issued a decree restoring the oversight powers of provincial councils over local government departments. That action ended a strike by provincial councils that had commenced after the lower house of the National Assembly had voted to remove the oversight powers on 28 January.

12. President Ghani continued to engage with Afghan and regional interlocutors to promote national reconciliation. On 30 April, during his visit to India, President Ghani took the opportunity to express openness to the Taliban and other anti-Government groups playing a role within the political landscape of Afghanistan, as distinct from "foreign terrorist fighters" whom he stated had no place in Afghanistan's future. In a joint press conference on 12 May during the visit to Kabul of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, President Ghani underlined that the two countries faced common enemies, a statement echoed by Prime Minister Sharif. In his domestic outreach, President Ghani publicly assured Afghan society, including political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders and civil society activists, that a potential peace process would be conducted in an inclusive and transparent manner. In that regard, it was emphasized by government officials that any negotiations with the Taliban would preserve the achievements of the past 14 years, including women's rights, and would reaffirm Afghanistan's national interests, also in relation to its neighbours. On 2 and 3 May, a "track-two" meeting was convened in Qatar by a non-governmental organization. A diverse group of Afghans attended in their personal capacities.

13. In support of a rights-based approach to a durable peace process, the civil society-led Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace commenced its third phase of

activities, focusing on convening policymakers and civil society organizations to assist in the implementation of national and provincial road maps for peace. Facilitation is provided by the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

14. The joint secretariat of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme reported that as at 30 April 2015 a total of 10,240 individuals, including 949 commanders, had joined the programme, and 7,813 weapons had been collected, since the inception of the programme in August 2010. In addition to drawing low-level fighters off the battlefield, the programme continued to support livelihood and reintegration opportunities to support former combatants and their communities.

B. Security

15. The security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, as anti-Government elements continued to test the capability and resolve of the Afghan National Security Forces across the country. In the week after the 22 April announcement by the Taliban of the start of the spring offensive there was a 45 per cent increase in recorded armed clashes, compared with 2014.

16. As mentioned above, the United States and Afghanistan announced in their joint statement that the United States would maintain its current posture of 9,800 troops through the end of 2015. The non-combat Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continued to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces. At a meeting held in Antalya, Turkey, on 13 May, NATO Ministers for Foreign Affairs endorsed a set of guidelines and principles for NATO post-2016 support to the Afghan National Security Forces. Following the closure of the Resolute Support Mission at the end of 2016, the NATO-Afghanistan enhanced enduring partnership will be civilian-led but will maintain a military component. The Taliban condemned both developments.

17. Between 15 February and 30 April, the United Nations recorded 5,033 security-related incidents across the country, representing a 6 per cent increase against the same period in 2014 and a 45 per cent increase against the same period in 2013. The southern, south-eastern and eastern regions continued to account for the majority of security incidents in the country, with 71 per cent of the total incidents recorded during the period. The northern and north-eastern regions showed an increase of 12 per cent in security incident levels compared with the same period in 2014.

18. In the 22 April announcement of the spring offensive, named "Azm", the Taliban declared that targets would be "foreign occupiers especially their permanent military bases, their intelligence and diplomatic centres", as well as government officials and Afghan security forces. Although attacks were recorded on several international military bases, they amounted during the period to less than 1 per cent of recorded incidents. As seen in past offensives and during the period as a whole, the Afghan security forces and government personnel and facilities were the main target of Taliban operations.

19. The security situation in the northern province of Kunduz deteriorated significantly with the launch on 25 April of a major assault by anti-Government elements, comprised of the Taliban, and, most likely, foreign fighters pushed into Afghanistan from their bases in North Waziristan following counter-insurgency

operations by the Pakistani military. This necessitated the deployment of reinforcements by Afghan security forces to contain the situation and ensure the security of the provincial capital, Kunduz City, as well as the district administrative centres. With the deployment of additional security forces, the situation reportedly stabilized. Anti-Government elements launched additional operations, aimed at undermining the credibility of the security forces, in other provinces including Badakhshan, Badghis, Faryab and Kunar.

20. Responding to heightened concerns over the security situation, the Government underlined to the public and members of the National Assembly the efforts of the Afghan security forces. Since assuming the responsibility for security, the Afghan security forces continued to plan and launch operations countrywide. After undertaking a large scale operation in Hilmand Province between mid-February and mid-April, Afghan security forces conducted similar scale operations in Faryab, Kunduz and Nangarhar. Additional operations took place in other areas that had long been under the control of insurgents, such as the Nawa District in Ghazni Province.

21. Attrition rates for both the security forces and anti-Government elements reportedly increased as the fighting intensified. The Ministry of Interior confirmed a significant increase in casualties sustained by the security forces in the first 15 weeks of the year, while both government and independent estimates indicated that insurgents suffered similarly high losses.

22. Established trends in the typology of reported security incidents remained unchanged, with armed clashes accounting for the majority (54 per cent) of security incidents, followed by improvised explosive devices accounting for 28 per cent of total incidents. Anti-Government elements also sought to exert influence through intimidation, including targeted killings. In total, from 15 February to 30 April, 160 assassinations and 40 failed assassination attempts were recorded, representing a 10 per cent increase against the same period in 2014. In addition, 91 abductions were recorded across the country during the reporting period, representing a 21.3 per cent increase, compared with the same period in 2014. Suicide attacks decreased from 25 to 23 compared with the same period in 2014. There were several high-profile incidents during the reporting period in Kabul City, including the assassination of the Chief of Police of Uruzgan on 18 March, two suicide car bomb attacks on international military forces on 26 February and 10 April and an attack on a private guesthouse on 13 May. The Taliban claimed responsibility for all four attacks. Responsibility for an unsuccessful suicide attack on a member of the National Assembly on 29 March has not been claimed by any insurgent group.

23. In May 2015, the Ministry of Interior estimated that there were some 7,180 foreign fighters across Afghanistan, the majority associated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There was continued speculation on the presence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and affiliated groups. On 31 March, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIL, and there were further unconfirmed reports of several extremist insurgent groups also joining ISIL. However, despite the initial attribution of several attacks, most notably a suicide attack on a bank in Jalalabad on 18 April, there remained a lack of clarity on any operational presence by ISIL.

24. During the reporting period there were 27 security incidents involving United Nations personnel, including 12 incidents of intimidation, 3 detentions, 8 criminal-

related, 3 attacks with small arms fire on United Nations convoys in the provinces of Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar and 1 brief abduction of a United Nations national staff member in the south-eastern region.

C. Regional cooperation

25. Afghanistan's National Unity Government continued its active engagement with regional partners. On 19 and 20 April, President Ghani visited the Islamic Republic of Iran. After meetings with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, the two countries pledged greater cooperation in the areas of security information sharing, counter-narcotics, the sharing of water resources, and refugees and migrants. From 27 to 29 April, President Ghani travelled to India, where he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Shri Pranab Mukherjee. India reiterated its readiness to join the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. On 11 May, the lower house of the National Assembly ratified a strategic partnership agreement with Turkey, aimed at promoting further cooperation in the fields of governance, and social, economic and political affairs.

26. Discussions on Afghanistan, including on security and economic issues, continued in multilateral cooperation forums. Activities under the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process included two regional technical group meetings on confidence-building measures, namely, counter-terrorism on 11 March in Ankara and counter-narcotics on 29 April in Baku. On 25 May, a meeting of Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process senior officials was held in Islamabad. The discussions centred on regional cooperation to address security challenges and the Afghan peace process, including the role of the region, as well as regional priorities for economic connectivity. On 21 May, the International Contact Group on Afghanistan met in Kabul to consider issues related to security, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, human rights, elections and regional dialogue.

27. At meetings of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on 2 April and the Commonwealth of Independent States on 3 April, ministers for foreign affairs discussed the situation in Afghanistan. Central Asian representatives expressed increasing concern at the spread of violent extremism from Afghanistan and agreed to strengthen their southern borders. Similar concerns were expressed during the 14 April meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Moscow, at which Afghanistan was represented for the first time as an observer.

28. From 4 to 6 March, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force held a workshop in Ashgabat on counter-terrorism and a border security workshop. Participants agreed that securing borders required a multidimensional approach incorporating development and technological aspects, backed by political will. United Nations entities and the Governments of Afghanistan and Tajikistan also organized a conference on counter-terrorism in Dushanbe on 14 and 15 May. Participants shared views on lessons learned from the development of an action plan for implementation of the United Nations counter-terrorism strategy in Central Asia, for possible use in the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process.

29. On 9 and 10 April in Dushanbe, experts from the three countries finalized the draft Afghanistan-Pakistan-Tajikistan Trilateral Transit Trade Agreement. On 24 April, the Ministers of Water and Power of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan signed the final pending documents for the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project. Construction is scheduled to begin in September 2015, with completion planned for 2018. Afghanistan is to receive 300 of the 1,300 MW of electricity delivered from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as revenue from transit fees.

30. A number of high-level contacts between Afghanistan and Pakistan took place towards improving their bilateral relationship and demonstrating the will of both countries to enhance their political and military cooperation. During his visit to Kabul on 12 May, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan reiterated his country's support for the National Unity Government and for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. Visits to Kabul were made by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, the Head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, former President Asif Ali Zardari and former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani. On 18 May, the Afghan National Directorate of Security and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation. The memorandum sparked intense discussions within the Afghan National Assembly and political sphere, with the National Directorate of Security subsequently issuing a statement on 24 May in which it noted that the memorandum would be finalized only after wider consultations. On 26 May, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Hekmat Karzai, and the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Aizaz Chaudhry, met in Islamabad to discuss a number of issues pertaining to peace and stability, counter-terrorism, border security, economic cooperation, Afghan refugees and regional cooperation.

III. Human rights

31. Between 15 February and 30 April, UNAMA documented 2,126 civilian casualties (669 killed and 1,457 injured), reflecting a sharp increase of 23 per cent over the same period in 2014. The trend of record high numbers of civilian casualties continued. UNAMA attributed 1,545 civilian casualties (534 killed and 1,011 injured) to anti-Government elements, accounting for 73 per cent of total civilian casualties. UNAMA recorded 302 civilian casualties (74 killed and 228 injured) attributed to pro-Government forces (11 per cent to Afghan National Security Forces, 2 per cent to pro-Government militia and 1 per cent to international military forces), an 88 per cent increase, accounting for 14 per cent of total civilian casualties. Eight per cent of all civilian casualties resulted from unattributed crossfire between pro-Government forces and anti-Government elements while 5 per cent were mainly from unattributed explosive remnants of war. Ground engagements continued to be the leading cause of civilian casualties, causing 617 civilian casualties (150 killed and 467 injured), followed by improvised explosive devices, accounting for 503 civilian casualties (162 killed and 341 injured).

32. Large-scale attacks by anti-Government elements deliberately targeting civilians continued during the reporting period. On 18 April, a suicide attacker detonated his explosive vest at the entrance of a bank in Jalalabad City, Nangarhar Province, targeting civilian government officials who were collecting their salaries and killing 30 civilians and injuring 123 others. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the 13 May attack on a Kabul guest house, at which a cultural event was being

hosted, resulting in 14 civilian deaths and injuries to several others. Civilian casualties attributed to pro-Government forces included an incident on 24 April in Alingar District, Laghman Province, in which a mortar round fired by the Afghan National Army impacted a civilian residence, killing seven civilians and injuring eight. The national army reported that they had fired the mortar following an attack against an army check post.

33. From 1 January to 10 May, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 11 separate attacks against legal professionals and courthouses, causing 114 civilian casualties, with 28 killed and 86 injured, an increase of more than 600 per cent over the same period the previous year. Figures recorded by UNAMA indicate higher casualty numbers than those claimed by the Taliban, as well as an additional six incidents of abductions, threats, intimidations and harassment of judicial authorities. This included the 9 April attack against the office of the Attorney General in Mazar-e-Sharif and the two suicide attacks on 4 and 10 May against civilian buses transporting employees of the Attorney General's Office in Kabul.

34. On 22 April, under the rubric of the announcement launching their spring offensive, the Taliban released a statement instructing the group's fighters to avoid civilian casualties. The statement listed a number of protected facilities, including schools, universities and health centres, as well as public welfare projects. Following the Taliban statement and a series of deliberate attacks on civilians claimed by the Taliban, UNAMA issued two public statements condemning the attacks against the Attorney General's Office on 10 May and against a guest house in Kabul and the Department of Haj and Religious Endowment in Hilmand on 13 May. Both statements reiterated that international humanitarian law, which binds all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian locations. On 14 May, the Taliban stated they did not accept any foreigner as falling under the definition of "civilian", but did not address the issue of Afghan civilians killed in any of the recent attacks.

35. The United Nations-led country task force on monitoring and reporting on children and armed conflict documented 523 child casualties (135 killed and 388 injured) in 254 incidents between 15 February and 30 April. Child casualties increased 2 per cent compared with the previous reporting period. Most child casualties continued to be caused during ground engagements between pro-Government forces and anti-Government elements (270 casualties), followed by improvised explosive devices attacks (124 casualties) and explosive remnants of war (80 casualties). Children were especially vulnerable in the southern region of the country, which witnessed 27 per cent of the total child casualties reported, owing mainly to an increase in ground engagements. Anti-Government elements were responsible for 46 per cent of the total child casualties, while pro-Government forces were responsible for 18 per cent. The remaining 36 per cent of casualties were unattributed. On 14 March, the Government of Afghanistan submitted to the United Nations its fourth progress report on the implementation of the children and armed conflict action plan. In its report, the Government highlighted steps taken during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2014 to advance implementation of the action plan and the annexes on reporting on killing, maiming and sexual violence against children.

36. On 19 April, UNAMA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched a report entitled "Justice through the

eyes of Afghan women: cases of violence against women addressed through mediation and court adjudication", featuring documentation of the significant use of mediation, rather than court adjudication, to resolve cases and recommendations for reforms to improve women's access to justice.

37. The killing of a 27-year-old woman on 19 March by a crowd in Kabul City, over false allegations that she had burned a copy of the Koran, sparked public outrage and widespread condemnation across Afghanistan and internationally. The Government condemned the attack and launched an investigation. On 6 May, the primary court in Kabul convicted 12 civilians of the murder, sentencing 4 of them to death. All court decisions are currently subject to appeal. On 19 May, the verdict for the 19 police officers charged was announced, with 11 officers sentenced to one year in prison for dereliction of duty and the remaining eight acquitted owing to lack of evidence. Afghan and international human rights and legal defence groups expressed serious concerns about the legal process for all convictions stating that they failed to comply with Afghan and international fair trial standards.

38. Speaking at a 5 March event ahead of International Women's Day, President Ghani emphasized the commitment of the Government to bringing fundamental and sustainable change for Afghan women, including for participation in decision-making, economic empowerment, education and health. The United Nations supported outreach activities across the country around International Women's Day, on the global theme "Empower women; empower humanity". From 9 to 20 March, the United Nations supported the participation of a Government of Afghanistan delegation to the fifty-ninth session of the Commission on the Status of Women, which was held at United Nations Headquarters.

39. During the reporting period, the Government outlined a proposal for a national plan for elimination of torture as part of its response to a UNAMA report, released on 25 February, on the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan custody. The proposed national plan, to be overseen by the Office of National Security Adviser and the Second Vice-President, includes regulatory reforms, prevention measures and training. The Second Vice-President informed UNAMA and Afghan civil society organizations on 29 April that a committee with their participation would be formed to draft an action plan and monitor its implementation.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul process and coordination of development assistance

40. During the period under review, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah engaged directly on the development agenda, requesting presentations from major donors, international financial institutions and the United Nations on their current development portfolios. The review of the portfolios and the annual Ministry of Finance-led development cooperation dialogue process are expected to inform the future development strategies and policies of the Government. On 8 March, the United Nations submitted its portfolio review to the Office of the President. It is expected that the proposed United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2015-2019, endorsed in principle by the former administration on 6 May 2014 but pending approval by the new Government, will be informed by the current deliberations. Thus far, the Government has expressed its intention to consolidate the current 22 national priority programmes.

41. On 3 April, the Cabinet approved the proposed plan of the Ministry of Finance for reform implementation and monitoring. Drawing on the paper entitled "Realizing self-reliance", which was shared at the December 2014 London Conference, the plan consists of 52 measures, of which 26 are identified as priorities for action within six months. The Ministry of Finance engaged with line ministries to advance the plan.

42. The economic and fiscal situation in Afghanistan remained challenging. According to World Bank data, Afghanistan achieved a 2 per cent growth rate in 2014, with a rate of 2.5 per cent forecast for 2015. As a consequence of poor economic performance, fiscal vulnerabilities were likely to remain high in 2015. According to World Bank analysis, there was a need for dramatically improved revenue performance relative to 2014 in order to avoid a higher than budgeted fiscal gap in 2015. Furthermore, it was emphasized that economic recovery required the implementation of reforms to address revenue and corruption and governance concerns, particularly those affecting confidence in the economy.

43. On 20 March, the International Monetary Fund announced a nine-month staff-monitored programme, aimed at addressing fiscal and banking vulnerabilities, preserving international reserves and low debt, maintaining low inflation and strengthening competitiveness. In response to the programme, the Government significantly increased some customs duties and the enforcement of income tax laws. The Ministry of Finance indicated that initial revenue projections were 4 per cent above the targets agreed with the International Monetary Fund and that the Government was able to cover its planned expenditures, including salaries and operational costs.

44. The Government of Afghanistan continued to pursue the development of extractive industries as a significant economic opportunity. In response to an 8 February request by the Government, the United Nations provided support in the areas of policy development, regulatory capacities and public consultations. It also supported the Ministry of Commerce and Industries in conducting an archaeological screening in Hajigk, a priority area for exploration. At the board meeting of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, on 14 and 15 April, Afghanistan was granted an 18-month candidacy extension to join the Initiative, in keeping with a commitment to the Government's reform agenda.

45. Regarding the Government's efforts to address illicit land usurpation, on 19 March, the United Nations released a report with recommendations on developing oversight and accountability in the land distribution framework, including a centralized land management system. In April, the Supreme Court and the Second Vice-President agreed that responsibility for land titles would be transferred to the Afghanistan Independent Land Authority. Established by presidential decree on 8 April, the High Council on Land and Water convened for the first time on 5 May, chaired by President Ghani. President Ghani expressed his commitment to addressing land usurpation as a factor having an impact on socioeconomic development. The Ministry of Commerce and Industries was assisted by UNAMA in developing proposed legal amendments aimed at strengthening the environment for business and trade.

46. On 26 April, the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee released its seventh biannual report, covering the period from July to December 2014, and a compendium of the status of implementation of its

323 recommendations, covering an array of anti-corruption issues of relevance to both the Government and the international community. In the report, the Committee noted that 53 recommendations had been completely implemented, 149 recommendations were under implementation or had been partially implemented, 33 recommendations had not yet been implemented and 88 recommendations had been recently issued, their implementation status not yet reviewed.

47. At a 12 March meeting of the International Police Coordination Board, the Minister of Interior launched a strategy for the professionalization of the police, including measures for increased accountability and improved relations between police and communities. During the reporting period, the United Nations continued to advocate for accountable policing, to build capacity and to support the professionalization of women officers. As at 28 April, 52 police women councils were established, 12 of which were within the Ministry of Interior directorates, 10 in Kabul police districts and 30 in the other provinces. The Ministry of Interior was assisted by the United Nations in the provision of literacy classes to the police, with 4,989 officers, including 202 women, currently enrolled in programmes across 19 provinces.

V. Humanitarian assistance

48. The humanitarian situation remained challenging owing to a combination of conflict and extreme weather conditions, with continued population displacement and increased vulnerability levels among affected communities. Relief operations reached some 8,827 families affected by natural disasters, and progress was made in key areas, such as immunization programmes. However, acute food insecurity and access to vulnerable populations, as well as the safety of humanitarian workers, remained major sources of concern. At meetings in Islamabad and Tehran, significant progress was made on the formulation of comprehensive return and reintegration strategies for Afghan refugees, whose levels of voluntary return continued to remain high compared with 2014.

49. At the 25th meeting of the Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan, held in Islamabad on 11 March, representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees agreed to support a comprehensive return and reintegration strategy for Afghan refugees. The strategy would include a process of voluntary repatriation and reintegration, taking into account Afghanistan's absorption capacity, while Pakistan would agree to register all undocumented Afghan migrants. As a result, Afghanistan established a high national commission on migration, chaired by the President, to deal with overall displacement issues, including refugee returns and reintegration.

50. On 19 May, the fourth meeting of the Quadripartite Steering Committee on the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries comprised of Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was held in Tehran. The role that Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan have played in hosting large Afghan refugee communities was acknowledged and the need for joint planning to include approaches to the issue of economic migrants was emphasized.

51. The levels of voluntary return of Afghan refugees and undocumented Afghans continued to remain high compared with the same period in 2014. The overall rate of undocumented Afghans returning from Pakistan through the Torkham and Spin Boldak border crossing points stands at 172 per cent of total returns and deportations in the same period in 2014. From 1 January to 30 April, 149,555 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran (Islamic Republic of) (84,502) and Pakistan (65,053), compared with 76,238 during the same period in 2014. A total of 75,027 undocumented Afghans were deported from Iran (Islamic Republic of) (68,094) and Pakistan (6,933), compared with 68,619 during the same period in 2014. During the first four months of 2015, 21,505 refugees returned under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees voluntary repatriation programme, compared with 3,817 during the same period in 2014, of which 95 per cent were from Pakistan. It was estimated that 30 to 40 per cent of returnees from Pakistan were in need of assistance. However, owing to funding shortfalls, only 10 per cent can be assisted. Beyond short-term needs, assistance with durable livelihoods and reintegration support is required.

52. Afghanistan continued to host a significant number of refugees in Khost and Paktika Provinces who had fled North Waziristan, Pakistan, owing to military operations. Following a United Nations reverification exercise in both provinces, a 15 per cent decrease in the number of registered refugees since 31 January was recorded. As at 21 April, there were 35,252 families, totalling 243,248 individuals registered as refugees (175,929 in Khost, 67,319 in Paktika). Humanitarian agencies have continued to provide them with assistance.

53. As at 30 April, the Task Force on Internally Displaced Persons, co-chaired by the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation and UNHCR, recorded 35,800 persons displaced as a result of conflict in 2015. The highest number of displaced persons were recorded in Faryab and Hilmand Provinces, with 519 families (3,206 individuals) and 374 families (2,938), respectively. During the reporting period, Kunduz Province emerged as the primary area of concern, with conflict between Government forces and anti-Government elements leading to large-scale displacement. Humanitarian actors continue to conduct joint assessments of families who have petitioned the Departments of Refugees and Repatriation for assistance, with 8,558 families assessed to date, of which 3,640 families have been verified as conflict-displaced persons in need of assistance. From March to May, the United Nations used its extensive logistical network to assist approximately 238,000 conflict-displaced persons with an estimated 7,800 metric tons of food.

54. Mine action partners, coordinated by the United Nations, cleared 46 minefields and three battlefields in 14 Afghan communities in the first quarter of 2015. Funding may not be sufficient, however, to meet the 2015 targets of the workplan under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. It is estimated that 4,025 minefields and 245 battlefields remain, affecting 1,603 communities across 255 districts, threatening the lives and livelihoods of Afghan civilians. Working with NATO Resolute Support Mission, the United Nations continued to address explosive hazard contamination, including firing ranges, from operations of the former International Security Assistance Force.

55. During the reporting period, 24 out of 34 provinces were affected by extreme weather, including avalanches, heavy snowfall and flooding. A total of 290 people were reported killed, 97 injured and 9,009 houses damaged or destroyed. The

national disaster management committee and humanitarian agencies continued efforts to respond to the food and non-food needs of all affected populations with available stocks.

56. Preliminary assessments conducted by the food security and agriculture cluster during the reporting period indicated that the purchasing power of vulnerable households had deteriorated by approximately 10 per cent in most parts of the country in the past five years. This is expected to be compounded by high levels of acute food insecurity among displaced households owing to conflict or natural disasters, as well as returning refugees and existing poor households. According to indications, continued severe food insecurity will affect approximately 1.4 million people across the country.

57. Polio eradication efforts continued to face access challenges in southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as in the south-eastern and western regions. Since the lifting of a temporary access ban by armed non-state actors in Hilmand Province in early February, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative conducted supplementary polio immunization activities. Despite those efforts, the first case of polio in Afghanistan for 2015 was identified in January in Reg District, Hilmand Province. Between January and May, one National Immunization Day and seven vaccination campaigns were held, including in newly accessible areas in Panjwaj District, Kandahar Province; Barg-i Matal District, Nuristan Province; and Lal Pur District, Nangarhar Province. During the reporting period, polio campaigners focused on low-performing districts in southern, eastern, western and south-eastern Afghanistan, leading to successful campaigns in Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghaman, Kandahar, Hilmand, Paktika, and Farah Provinces.

58. Despite the increase in security incidents during the first quarter of 2015, the volume of incidents against humanitarian-related personnel, assets and facilities and violations against health facilities remained consistent with the same period in 2014. The United Nations global monitoring framework recorded a total of 74 incidents between 1 January and 30 April, of which 52 affected non-governmental organizations. The incidents included the killing of 11 aid workers, with another 10 injured. In addition, 54 aid workers were abducted and 2 arrested. There were 11 incidents recorded against health facilities or workers and 2 against demining sites.

59. As at 30 April, humanitarian funding for Afghanistan reached $172 million, of which $129.5 million is designated for activities foreseen within the Humanitarian Strategic Response Plan and $24.6 million for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. As at 1 June the Humanitarian Strategic Response Plan was 27 per cent funded. Ninety-three per cent of the designated funds of the Plan are allocated to agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system and 7 per cent to non-governmental organizations. The common humanitarian pooled fund has received $18.3 million. As a result of funding constraints, shortfalls in available food supplies are anticipated in June and will have a serious impact on the humanitarian response to address acute malnutrition. In order for operations to continue throughout 2015, the World Food Programme is conducting an urgent appeal for $65.6 million. That funding would serve to support the humanitarian needs of thousands of people recently displaced by conflict in a number of provinces, notably Kunduz, as well as other emerging humanitarian needs.

VI. Counter-narcotics

60. On 21 April, the socioeconomic analysis portion of the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014 was released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The report analysed the opiate economy and the factors and determinants driving opium poppy cultivation. Despite estimated potential gross value of opiates in Afghanistan decreasing by almost 9 per cent to $2.84 billion since the previous year, opiates still account for the equivalent of 13 per cent of the country's gross domestic product. A highly attractive crop to farmers, opium cultivation in many rural communities remains high, accounting for 36 per cent of the income of farmers who cultivate it. The price decrease in the average farm-gate price of dry opium in 2014 was also reflected in a decrease in heroin prices both within Afghanistan and across borders, although existing information does not show a major change in demand in the main opiate-consuming countries.

61. During the period under review, drug crop eradication led by provincial governors was reported in nine provinces in Afghanistan, with a total of 3,042 ha of opium poppy being eradicated as at 10 May. Initial assessments indicate security incidents during the eradication efforts are lower, compared with previous years, owing to the efforts of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to improve coordination with the other ministries with a security remit. Five members of the security forces have been killed and 16 personnel wounded since the start of the eradication operations in 2015.

62. Afghan law enforcement authorities also conducted a total of 841 counter-narcotics operations during the reporting period, resulting in the seizure of approximately 14,576 kg of narcotics. This included 898 kg of heroin, 8,607 kg of opium, and 5,071 kg of cannabis. In addition, 504 kg of solid precursor chemicals and 1,540 L of liquid precursor chemicals were seized. Two heroin manufacturing laboratories were dismantled, 818 suspects were arrested, and 187 vehicles and 152 weapons were seized. During those operations, two members of the security forces were killed and three were wounded. The efforts of the border liaison offices that support operations with Afghan, Iranian, Pakistani, Tajik and Uzbek border police operations collectively resulted in the seizure of 3,027 kg of narcotics within the overall seizure total.

VII. Mission support

63. UNAMA has continued to ensure effective use of its resources to accomplish cost-efficient operations in support of mandated activities throughout the country. UNAMA preparations for the roll-out of the next phase of Umoja are on track.

VIII. Observations

64. The formation of the National Unity Government is nearly complete. After a long and challenging process, the appointment of all ministers and the formalization of the Office of the Chief Executive and the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers are important achievements. The development and implementation of 100-day action plans for each ministry, now under way, should help to realize shared national

objectives. With the Cabinet all but in place, it is imperative that the Government accelerate its reform agenda.

65. The creation of the Special Commission on Electoral Reform demonstrates the commitment of the National Unity Government to electoral reforms, as provided for in the 21 September 2014 agreement. Comprehensive electoral reforms will be crucial for restoring the faith of the Afghan people in the democratic process. That is a matter of urgency since, as according to the Afghan Constitution, parliamentary elections, as well as those for district councils, should already have taken place. I encourage the Government and relevant bodies to launch the electoral reform process and determine the electoral calendar. It will also be important to provide certainty on the role of the lower house of the National Assembly after the conclusion of its term on 22 June. The United Nations looks forward to engaging with the Commission and stands ready to provide advice.

66. The priority actions identified by the Government under the "Realizing Self-reliance" agenda, including to advance reforms, strengthen public accountability and promote economic growth are encouraging. In that regard, 100-day action plans have the potential to build the necessary public confidence and buy-in. Continuing to provide international assistance to Afghanistan will be necessary in the short and longer terms. The agreement on the International Monetary Fund programme represents an important step towards securing longer-term access by the Government to financial support.

67. The intensification of the conflict across the country hampered progress across a range of issues and exacted a terrible toll on the civilian population. I am deeply concerned by the dramatic increase in civilian casualties, despite public commitments by the parties to protect civilians. Attacks deliberately targeting civilians are strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law. During the reporting period anti-Government elements repeatedly attacked civilians working in the justice system, a deplorable targeting of civilian personnel. The conflict continues to displace significant numbers of civilians, in addition to those in Afghanistan displaced by military operations in Pakistan.

68. I am encouraged by the constructive dialogue between the Governments of Afghanistan and host countries on the formulation of comprehensive return and reintegration strategies for Afghan refugees. With the growing issue of internal displacement in Afghanistan, however, there will be a need to ensure national capacities to manage the volume of returns. The support of Member States to address the immediate and long-term needs of returnees will be necessary.

69. It is my grave concern that the humanitarian situation will deteriorate further if fighting intensifies. In order for relief efforts to succeed, the safety of humanitarian workers and access to vulnerable individuals remain of critical importance. All parties to the conflict must respect their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian laws. The generous contributions by Member States have supported efforts to prevent and alleviate the suffering of thousands of ordinary Afghans. Nevertheless, I note with concern that humanitarian funding is currently lower than it was at the time in 2014, while the needs are significantly higher and continue to increase.

70. I continue to be concerned about violence against women and the management of such cases by the criminal justice system. The public murder of a woman by a

mob of men on 19 March in broad daylight in the capital underscored the continuing threat of violence against women. However, the outrage expressed peacefully in the wake of the killing by countless ordinary Afghans was unparalleled and spurred discussions in Afghan society on the necessity of addressing those issues. It is essential to the credibility of the justice system that allegations of abuse and mistreatment are thoroughly investigated and appropriately prosecuted so that those responsible can be held accountable. Securing a robust and transparent criminal justice system, with due regard to protecting the rights of women, remains vital.

71. Afghanistan continues to deepen its interaction with its neighbours in respect of building regional confidence and connectivity. The increased engagement during the reporting period between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, including public declarations stating their commitment to work together for peace and prosperity, is encouraging. Visits by President Ghani to India and Iran (Islamic Republic of) pointed to the importance accorded by his Government to those key partners as well. During my upcoming visit to Central Asia, I will underline the importance of strengthening trade and exchange with Afghanistan in order to boost shared economic growth and regional stability.

72. Afghans desperately want respite from the ever-present violence that has such a damaging impact on their lives. At local events and meetings, they continue to express their desire for peace and its realization through dialogue. The Government of Afghanistan has stated its commitment to engage in talks with the Taliban, who have indicated their interest in a political process. An essential element that is missing, however, is the willingness of the armed opposition to meet the Government in direct talks. Without that engagement, no meaningful progress towards a peace negotiation will be possible. The United Nations will continue to provide support in that regard, in close consultation with the Government of Afghanistan.

73. In reference to the request by the Security Council that I conduct an examination of the role, structure and activities of all United Nations entities in Afghanistan, it was recently agreed to establish a Tripartite Commission, comprised of representatives of the Government, the international donor community, and UNAMA and affiliated agencies, funds and programmes. While that discussion is at its early stages, I am confident that it has the potential to be fruitful.

74. Finally, I thank all the United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and my Special Representative, Nicholas Haysom, for their commitment under challenging conditions, to support a more peaceful, prosperous and stable Afghanistan.

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Letter dated 9 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 June 2015, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

15-09596 (E) 160615

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Annex to the letter dated 9 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 26 May 2015 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/69/913-S/2015/379), which, yet again, contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. To set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As to the remarks regarding the issuance of an anti-notice to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan Advisory Airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out in coordination with the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the assertion raised in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot Administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island. As noted in our previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot Administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding the Ercan Airport in the North, it should, once again, be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan Area Control Centre and Airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and permission of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Civil Aviation Department, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off

from Ercan Airport as well as using the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased, in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan Area Control Centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara Area Control Centre to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2014 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan Airport stood at almost 3,250,000, while the projected number of passengers for 2015 is 3,500,000. Moreover, in 2014, around 25,000 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 200,000 planes used the Ercan Advisory Airspace. These numbers are expected to be around 27,000 and 210,000, respectively, for 2015. In this respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention, and is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false statements, to confer legitimacy upon the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile because the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to put an end to misappropriating for itself the rights and responsibilities that it does not legally have and to cease its hostile acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot Administration should, once again, be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the north of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive propaganda tactics and focus on the negotiating process so that the current window of opportunity for a fair and durable comprehensive settlement can be seized. As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2015/424

Security Council

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15 June 2015

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Letter dated 11 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit to you a press release by the Government of Burundi regarding the statement made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, on 9 June 2015 concerning the current situation in Burundi (see annex).

I kindly request that the current letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Albert **Shingiro**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-09786 (E) 160615 170615

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Annex to the letter dated 11 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]

Government communiqué following the statements made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The Government of Burundi has closely followed the statement made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, on 9 June 2015. His very pessimistic and biased statement concerning the situation in Burundi was released only a few days before the forthcoming municipal and legislative elections.

The statement denounces the behaviour of what the High Commissioner describes as the pro-Government Imbonerakure militia, the youth wing of the ruling party, which he alleges has been carrying out "increasingly violent and threatening" actions that "could tip an already extremely tense situation over the edge." The High Commissioner claims to have received accounts from Burundian refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.

The Government is surprised that such statements by the High Commissioner always come shortly before elections are held. It will be recalled that a similar statement critical of the Imbonerakure was released at the end of his visit to Burundi from 13 to 15 April 2015, a few days before the municipal and legislative elections that were then postponed.

The Government wishes to make it known to the public that at no time did the United Nations representative for human rights in Burundi approach it to report such actions on the part of the Imbonerakure youth movement with a view to jointly verifying the allegations. The High Commissioner has likewise failed to produce a specific case that he himself might have verified.

It is similarly surprising that the statement made by the High Commissioner does not mention the return of large numbers of some refugees (over 30,000 to date) with the assistance of the Government of Burundi, as well as that of many others who wish to return but face resistance from the receiving services. It should also be noted that almost all of the civil servants who had moved to Kigali following the spreading of rumours have quietly returned and resumed their duties.

The Government of Burundi would like to point out that those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries did so in response to disinformation and at the instigation of certain members of the political elite and civil society that have already expressed their opposition to the electoral system as a means of gaining access to political power. Their accounts alone are not considered by the Government to have any credibility, especially since none of them showed the High Commissioner any traces of the violent acts to which they were allegedly subjected by the Imbonerakure before they fled into exile. Their departure from the country is more the result of speculation about political developments than of fears for their safety. Indeed, those who have returned have found that their property and homes have been well protected by those accused of having persecuted them.

The Government of Burundi considers that if there is a threat to peace in Burundi, it comes from those who foment unrest and fund violent demonstrations in which people who refused to join their movement have been taken hostage, children were deprived of the right to go to school, explosives were placed in public places, people accused of being members of the Imbonerakure were tortured and killed, their property was destroyed, and their homes and vehicles were torched along with public and private infrastructure. Anywhere else such actions would be described as terrorism.

It is, therefore, surprising that the report and statement released by the High Commissioner fails to mention such criminal acts even though they have taken place in broad daylight and been covered by the international media.

It should also be noted that there are no members of the Imbonerakure among the perpetrators of these acts of violence even though they have been subjected to numerous provocations by the demonstrators.

Given the above, the Government of Burundi denounces and condemns the position adopted by such a high ranking international civil servant, which can only further imperil an electoral process that is already threatened by political forces seeking to prevent the holding of elections and spread chaos for their own political ends.

Bujumbura, 11 June 2015
Philippe **Nzobonariba**
Secretary General and spokesman of the Government

United Nations S/2015/425

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President circulates herewith the report of the Director General dated 29 May 2015 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 29 May 2015 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and the enclosed report to the attention of all Members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

Main developments

- The Director General held talks with the Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Mohammad Javad Zarif on 27 April 2015. The exchange focused on how to accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues and on the Agency's monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when agreed and as requested. The Director General held follow up talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Abbas Araghchi on 14 May 2015.
- Iranian and Agency officials held further discussions on the continuation of the implementation of the Framework for Cooperation. The Agency and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue and to meet again in the near future.
- The Agency has continued to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as further extended.
- Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not enriched UF_6 above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities and all of its stock of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 has been further processed through downblending or conversion into uranium oxide.
- Enrichment of UF_6 up to 5% U-235 has continued at a rate of production similar to that indicated in the Director General's previous reports. The amount of such nuclear material that remains in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 is 8714.7 kg.
- No additional major components have been installed at the IR-40 Reactor and there has been no manufacture or testing of fuel for the reactor.
- Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.

Introduction

This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and

[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It contains information, inter alia, regarding the implementation of measures under the 'Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation' (the Framework for Cooperation) and the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as further extended.[2]

The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[3] are binding on Iran.[4] The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions[5] were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[6] The full implementation of Iran's obligations is needed in order to ensure international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

As previously reported, on 11 November 2013 the Agency and Iran signed a 'Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation' (GOV/INF/2013/14). In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step by step manner. The practical measures agreed, to date, in relation to the Framework for Cooperation are listed in Annex I.

As previously reported, on 24 November 2013 the JPA was agreed between China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (E3+3) and Iran.[7] The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, initially for a period of six months. As requested by the E3+3 and Iran, and endorsed by the Board of Governors (subject to the availability of funds), the Agency undertook the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in relation to the JPA, involving activities additional to those already being carried out pursuant to Iran's Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and Security Council. On 24 July 2014, the JPA was extended until 24 November 2014.[8]

On 24 November 2014, the JPA was further extended until 30 June 2015.[9] For the Agency to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities, an additional sum of €4.6 million of voluntary extrabudgetary contributions was required.[10] As of 21 May 2015, the pledges[11] of a number of Member States totalled €6.13 million.

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[2] GOV/INF/2014/28, Attachment; GOV/2014/62.

[3] Between September 2003 and September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran (see GOV/2013/56, footnote 2).

[4] Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

[5] GOV/2013/56, footnote 4.

[6] Part I.A of the Agency's Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11).

[7] The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).

[8] GOV/INF/2014/18, Annex.

[9] See footnote 2 of this report.

[10] GOV/2014/62, para. 9.

[11] As of 21 May 2015, €6.06 million had been received by the Agency.

In a Joint Statement[12] issued on 2 April 2015, it was announced that the E3/EU+3 and Iran had "reached solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", and were committed to complete their efforts by 30 June 2015. The Director General welcomed this statement and said that, upon finalization of an agreement and with the endorsement of the Board of Governors, the Agency would be ready to verify the implementation of the nuclear-related measures in that agreement.[13]

This report addresses developments since the Director General's previous report (GOV/2015/15),[14] as well as issues of longer standing.

Clarification of unresolved issues

The Board of Governors, in its resolution of November 2011 (GOV/2011/69), stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In its resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50), the Board of Governors decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Since the Director General's previous report, on 9 March 2015 and 15 April 2015, Iranian and Agency officials held further discussions in Tehran on the two practical measures *agreed in May 2014* in the third step of the *Framework for Cooperation that remained to be implemented, related* to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport calculations (see Annex I). Iran shared some information in relation to one of these measures. The Agency and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue on these practical measures and to meet again in the near future.

On 27 April 2015, the Director General held talks with the Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Mohammad Javad Zarif, in New York. The exchange focused on how to accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues and on the Agency's monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when agreed and as requested. They agreed to continue the dialogue between the Agency and Iran at all levels.

On 14 May 2015, the Director General held follow up talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Abbas Araghchi, in Vienna.

As previously reported, on several occasions since August 2014, the Agency has invited Iran to propose new practical measures that Iran would implement in the next step of the Framework for Cooperation.[15] Iran has yet to propose any new practical measures.

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[12] Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm).

[13] IAEA Director General Welcomes Lausanne Announcement (https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/).

[14] The Director General continues to provide the Board of Governors with monthly updates on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the JPA, the most recent of which was provided in GOV/INF/2015/8.

[15] GOV/2014/43, para. 13.

Facilities declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 18 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)[16] (Annex II). Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities and LOFs.

Enrichment-related activities

Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended all of its enrichment-related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. However, since 20 January 2014, Iran has not produced UF_6 enriched above 5% U-235 and all of its stock of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 has been further processed through downblending or conversion into uranium oxide. All of the enrichment-related activities at Iran's declared facilities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[17]

Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities.[18] Iran has also stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.[19]

Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities:

- 14 936.7 kg[20] (+761.8 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, of which 8714.7 kg (+761.8 kg since the Director General's previous report) remain in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235[21] and the rest has been further processed (see Annex III); and
- Up to the point at which it stopped producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, 447.8 kg of such nuclear material, all of which has been further processed through downblending or conversion into uranium oxide[22] (see Annex III).

[16] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

[17] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be subject to containment and surveillance.

[18] As declared by Iran in its design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

[19] GOV/2010/10, para. 8; and as declared by Iran in its DIQ for the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP).

[20] This figure includes 115.6 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 that has been produced from the downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235.

[21] This comprises nuclear material in storage as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and inside cylinders still attached to the enrichment process.

[22] Apart from 0.6 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, which are under Agency seal at Iran's declared enrichment facilities where the nuclear material had been used as reference material for mass spectrometry.

Natanz

Fuel Enrichment Plant: FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units, each containing 18 cascades, are planned for Production Hall A, which totals approximately 25 000 centrifuges in 144 cascades. Currently, one unit contains IR-2m centrifuges; five contain IR-1 centrifuges; and the other two units do not contain centrifuges. Iran has yet to provide the corresponding design information for Production Hall B. The Agency continues to verify that Production Hall B does not contain any centrifuges.

In the unit containing IR-2m centrifuges, as of 17 May 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: six cascades had been fully installed with IR-2m centrifuges;[23] none of these cascades had been fed with natural UF_6; and preparatory installation work had been completed for the other 12 IR-2m cascades in the unit.

In the five units containing IR-1 centrifuges, as of 17 May 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: 90 cascades had been fully installed,[24] of which 54 were being fed with natural UF_6.[25] As previously reported, preparatory installation work had been completed for 36 IR-1 cascades in the two units not containing centrifuges.

As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FEP between 15 November 2014 and 2 December 2014, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 16 November 2014.

As of 12 May 2015, Iran had fed 164 838 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FEP since production began in February 2007 and produced a total of 14 411 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[26]

As of 24 November 2014, Iran had downblended about 4118 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to natural uranium.[27]

Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP,[28] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).

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[23] The number of IR-2m centrifuges installed at FEP (1008) was also unchanged.

[24] The number of IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (15 420) was also unchanged.

[25] GOV/2014/10, para. 22. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that no more than the 54 IR-1 cascades (containing 9156 centrifuges) are being fed with nuclear material at FEP.

[26] Based on the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 16 November 2014) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 17 November 2014 to 12 May 2015).

[27] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA, as extended. The nuclear material originates from the tails produced by the enrichment of UF_6 up to 20% U-235 and from nuclear material evacuated from the cascades producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and is not included in the amount of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 indicated in para. 16.

[28] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 28 March 2015.

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: PFEP is a pilot LEU production, and research and development (R&D) facility that was first brought into operation in October 2003. It can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated by Iran for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated by Iran for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at PFEP between 13 and 30 September 2014, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 13 September 2014.

Production area: As indicated in the Director General's previous report, Iran has ceased feeding Cascades 1 and 6 with UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 and is feeding them with natural UF_6 instead.[29] On 8 February 2014, Iran provided an update to parts of the DIQ in which it stated that it had taken measures "due to change in level of enrichment" and that the measures "are temporarily taken during the first step implementation of the JPA".[30] Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated Cascades 1 and 6 in an interconnected configuration.[31]

As of 20 January 2014, when it ceased production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, Iran had fed 1630.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into Cascades 1 and 6 since production began in February 2010 and had produced a total of 201.9 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and 17 May 2015, Iran fed 1213.8 kg of natural UF_6 into Cascades 1 and 6 at PFEP and produced a total of 114.8 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[32]

R&D area: Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF_6 into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6 and IR-6s centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes. The Agency has verified that one IR-5 centrifuge and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge[33] are in place but without connections.[34]

Between 2 February 2015 and 17 May 2015, a total of approximately 410.7 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

Between 20 January 2014 and 20 July 2014, Iran downblended 108.4 kg of its inventory of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235.[35]

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[29] As of 25 May 2015, Cascades 1 and 6 contained a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges (unchanged).

[30] As further extended (see footnote 2 of this report).

[31] GOV/2014/10, para. 28. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that Cascades 1 and 6 are not interconnected.

[32] Based on the amounts of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 13 September 2014) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 14 September 2014 to 17 May 2015).

[33] GOV/2014/58, footnote 33.

[34] On 25 May 2015, there were two IR-1 centrifuges, 11 IR-4 centrifuges, one IR-5 centrifuge, 12 IR-6 centrifuges and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge installed in Cascade 2; eight IR-1 centrifuges, 26 IR-2m centrifuges and two IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 3; 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4; and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.

[35] By 20 July 2014, in line with the JPA, the downblending process had been completed.

Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at PFEP,[36] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

Fordow

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012, a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[37] The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is designed to contain up to 2976 centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. On 8 February 2014, Iran provided an update to parts of the DIQ in which it stated that it had taken measures "due to change in level of enrichment" and that the measures "are temporarily taken during the first step implementation of the JPA".[38]

As previously reported, Iran has ceased feeding UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the four cascades of Unit 2 previously used for this purpose and is feeding them with natural UF_6 instead. Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated these cascades in an interconnected configuration.[39] As of 20 May 2015, none of the other 12 cascades in FFEP had been fed with UF_6.[40]

The Agency is still evaluating the results of the PIV carried out at FFEP between 24 January 2015 and 8 February 2015.[41]

As of 20 January 2014, when it ceased production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, Iran had fed 1806 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the cascades at FFEP since production began in December 2011 and had produced a total of 245.9 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and 10 May 2015, Iran fed 3098.0 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FFEP and produced a total of 295.3 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[42]

Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,[43] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

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[36] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 16 March 2015.

[37] GOV/2009/74, paras. 7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs with different stated purposes for FFEP. In light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used, additional information from Iran is still required.

[38] As further extended (see footnote 2 of this report).

[39] GOV/2014/10, para. 36. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures at FFEP to confirm that only the four IR-1 cascades are used to enrich UF_6 and that they are not interconnected.

[40] The number of centrifuges installed at FFEP (2710) was also unchanged.

[41] GOV/2015/15, para. 32.

[42] Based on the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 24 January 2015) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 25 January 2015 to 10 May 2015).

[43] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 8 April 2015.

Other enrichment-related activities

Iran continues to provide the Agency with regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.[44] Such access, as well as associated mutually agreed information, was also provided by Iran pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation (see Annex I). As part of this managed access, Iran has also provided the Agency with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies to be used to replace those centrifuges that fail. The Agency has analysed the information provided by Iran and, upon request, has received additional clarifications. Based on analysis of all the information provided by Iran, as well as the managed access and other verification activities carried out by the Agency, the Agency can confirm that, since the JPA took effect, centrifuge rotor manufacturing and assembly are consistent with Iran's replacement programme for failed centrifuges.[45]

Reprocessing activities

Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[46] As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that "during the first step time-bound (six months), Iran will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing".[47] In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this "voluntary measure" had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.[48]

The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)[49] and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.[50] The Agency carried out an inspection and a design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 12 May 2015, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 13 May 2015. The Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing-related activities with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access in Iran.

Heavy water-related projects

Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water-related projects.[51] However, since the JPA took effect, Iran has neither installed any major components at the IR-40 Reactor nor produced nuclear fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP).

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[44] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[45] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[46] GOV/2013/56, footnote 28.

[47] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[48] As further extended (see footnote 2 of this report).

[49] The TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

[50] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR.

[51] GOV/2013/56, footnote 32.

IR-40 Reactor: The IR-40 Reactor, which is under Agency safeguards, is a 40 MW heavy water moderated research reactor designed to contain 150 fuel assemblies containing natural uranium in the form of UO_2.

On 11 May 2015, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that, since the Director General's previous report, none of the reactor's remaining major components had been installed.[52] As previously reported, pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation, Iran concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor in August 2014.[53]

Heavy Water Production Plant: The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is a facility for the production of heavy water with a design capacity to produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water per year.

As previously reported, although the HWPP is not under Agency safeguards, the plant was subject to managed access by the Agency on 8 December 2013.[54] During the managed access, Iran also provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information. In addition, access to the heavy water storage location at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan in February 2014 enabled the Agency to characterize the heavy water.[55]

Uranium conversion and fuel fabrication

Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP), FMP and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities and heavy water-related projects, notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards.

Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:

- Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF_6 at UCF, of which 179 tonnes have been transferred to FEP.
- Produced 13.8 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO_2 at UCF, of which 13.2 tonnes have been transferred to FMP.
- Transferred 6334 kg of natural UF_6 to EUPP. In addition, 4337 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 have been transferred from FEP to EUPP.
- Fed into the conversion process at EUPP 2720 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
- Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF_6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 and produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2.[56]

[52] GOV/2013/56, para. 34.
[53] GOV/2014/43, para. 46.
[54] GOV/2014/10, para. 13.
[55] GOV/2013/56, para. 39.
[56] GOV/2012/55, para. 35.

- Fed into the conversion process at FPFP 337.2 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8.[57]
- Used 101.3 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8 produced at FPFP for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR.

Uranium Conversion Facility: UCF is a conversion facility for the production of both natural UF_6 and natural UO_2 from uranium ore concentrate (UOC). It is planned that UCF will also produce UF_4 from depleted UF_6, and uranium metal ingots from natural and depleted UF_4.

Since January 2014, Iran has neither produced natural uranium in the form of UO_2 through the conversion of UOC at UCF, nor has it transferred any natural uranium in the form of UO_2 from UCF to FMP.

As previously reported, Iran has started the recovery of uranium from liquid and solid scrap resulting from conversion activities at UCF.[58] On 23 May 2015, the Agency observed that the recovery of uranium from such liquid scrap was ongoing.

On 23 May 2015, the Agency observed that activities relating to a physical inventory taking (PIT) were being conducted in preparation for the forthcoming PIV.

Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant: EUPP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO_2 powder.[59] As previously reported, Iran began commissioning the facility in May 2014 using natural uranium. As part of the commissioning, as of 23 May 2015, Iran had fed a total of 6319 kg of natural UF_6 into the conversion process and produced 1828.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2. Since the plant began operations in July 2014, Iran has fed 2720 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process for the production of UO_2.[60,61]

Between 4 and 6 April 2015, the Agency carried out a PIV at EUPP, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency.

On 23 May 2015, the Agency confirmed that EUPP was in operation and that 151.0 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced.

Fuel Manufacturing Plant: FMP is a facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for power and research reactors (see Annex III).

In a letter dated 21 February 2015, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to conduct a "sinterability test on UO_2 sample powder" (enriched and natural)[62] in the form of "VVER-type UO_2 pellets", which it would produce for this purpose. As of 24 May 2015, the Agency had verified the production of three sample batches of natural and LEU VVER-type UO_2 pellets.

On 17 May 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and verified that Iran had continued its cessation of production of nuclear fuel assemblies using natural UO_2 for the IR-40 Reactor and that all of the fuel assemblies that had been produced previously remained at FMP.

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[57] Unchanged since the Director General's previous report.

[58] GOV/2015/15, para. 46.

[59] GOV/2013/40, para. 45.

[60] Pursuant to Iran's undertaking under the JPA to convert into oxide "UF_6 newly enriched up to 5% during the six-month period".

[61] Unchanged from the figure indicated in the Director General's previous report.

[62] Such tests are conducted for quality control purposes.

Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant: FPFP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U_3O_8 (see Annex III).

As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that "during the first step of time-bound (six months), Iran declares that there is no reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235".[63] In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this "voluntary measure" had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.[64] On 19 and 20 May 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FPFP during which it confirmed that there was no process line at the plant for the reconversion of uranium oxide into UF_6.

As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at FPFP between 14 and 16 December 2014, the Agency has verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 13 December 2014.

As previously reported, Iran has fed a total of 337.2 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (227.6 kg of uranium) into the conversion process of FPFP. As of 18 May 2015, Iran had produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8 and generated solid and liquid scrap containing 55.4 kg of uranium. The remainder of the uranium that was fed into the process remains in the process and in waste. Of the 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8, Iran has used 101.3 kg to manufacture fuel items for TRR.

On 19 May 2015, the Agency observed that the process lines for the recovery of uranium from solid and liquid scrap at FPFP had yet to commence operation and that Iran was continuing to conduct R&D activities related to the recovery of uranium from solid scrap.

The Agency has verified that, as of 18 May 2015, Iran had produced at FPFP one experimental fuel assembly and 34 TRR-type fuel assemblies. Thirty of these fuel assemblies, including the experimental assembly, had been transferred to TRR.

Possible military dimensions

Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[65] The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[66]

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[63] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[64] As further extended (see footnote 2 of this report).

[65] For example: GOV/2011/65, paras. 38-45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras. 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras. 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras. 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras. 35-42.

[66] Security Council resolution 1929, paras. 2 and 3.

The Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.[67] The Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.

In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency's concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations,[68] and in August 2014, Iran stated that "most of the issues" in the Annex to GOV/2011/65 were "mere allegations and do not merit consideration".[69]

As indicated above (para. 3), in the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues.

As also indicated above (para. 9), since the Director General's previous report, Iranian and Agency officials have held further discussions on the two practical measures *agreed in May 2014* in the third step of the *Framework for Cooperation that remained to be implemented*. Iran shared some information in relation to one of these measures. The Agency and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue on these practical measures and to meet again in the near future.

Since the Director General's previous report, at a particular location at the Parchin site, the Agency has continued to observe, through satellite imagery, the presence of vehicles, equipment and probable construction materials, but no further external changes to the buildings on the site. As previously reported, the activities that have taken place at this location since February 2012 are likely to have undermined the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification.[70] It remains important for Iran to provide answers to the Agency's questions[71] and access to the particular location at the Parchin site.[72]

The Agency remains ready to accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues under the Framework for Co-operation. This can be realised by increased co-operation by Iran and by the timely provision of access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran as requested by the Agency. Once the Agency has established an understanding of the whole picture concerning issues with possible military dimensions, the Director General will report on the Agency's assessment to the Board of Governors.

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[67] GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.

[68] GOV/2012/9, para. 8.

[69] GOV/2014/43, para. 64.

[70] For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the publication of the Director General's May 2013 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44; GOV/2013/6, para. 52; and GOV/2013/27, para. 55. Further developments were reported in the Director General's reports of May 2014 (GOV/2014/28, para. 59), September 2014 (GOV/2014/43, para. 67) and November 2014 (GOV/2014/58, para. 59).

[71] GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C; GOV/2012/23, para. 5.

[72] The Agency has information provided by Member States indicating that Iran had constructed a large explosives containment vessel (chamber) at this location in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. Such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development (GOV/2011/65, Annex, paras. 49-51).

Design information

Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is required to implement the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information.[73],[74]

Additional Protocol

Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.[75]

Other matters

On 12 May 2015, the Agency confirmed that 19 fuel assemblies, which had been produced in Iran and which contain uranium that was enriched in Iran up to 20% U-235, were in the core of TRR.[76] On the same date, the Agency observed that the Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly was in the storage pool.[77]

As of 13 May 2015, the Agency confirmed that one fuel plate (the same one as indicated in the Director General's previous reports), containing a mixture of U_3O_8 (enriched up to 20% U-235) and aluminium, remained at the MIX facility, having been transferred from FPFP, and was being used for R&D activities aimed at optimizing the production of ^{99}Mo, ^{133}Xe and ^{131}I isotopes.[78]

On 15 and 16 April 2015, the Agency conducted a PIV and a DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant with the core of the reactor closed and the reactor shut down.

Summary

While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of

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[73] In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had suspended implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2007/8). In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative para. 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

[74] See GOV/2015/15, para. 65.

[75] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

[76] On 12 May 2015, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.

[77] GOV/2013/40, para. 64.

[78] GOV/2013/40, para. 65.

undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[79]

Iranian and Agency officials held further discussions on the continuation of the implementation of the Framework for Cooperation. The Agency and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue and to meet again in the near future.

In talks with the Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Mohammad Javad Zarif, and in follow up talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Abbas Araghchi, the Director General discussed the need to accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme and the Agency's monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when agreed and as requested.

The Agency remains ready to accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues under the Framework for Co-operation. This can be realised by increased co-operation by Iran and by the timely provision of access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran as requested by the Agency. Once the Agency has established an understanding of the whole picture concerning issues with possible military dimensions, the Director General will report on the Agency's assessment to the Board of Governors.

The Agency continues to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the JPA, as further extended.

The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

[79] The Board of Governors has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that para. 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865, paras. 53-54).

Annex I

Practical Measures agreed to date by the Agency and Iran, and to be implemented by Iran, in relation to the Framework for Cooperation

FIRST STEP: Six (Initial) Practical Measures, agreed on 11 November 2013

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
3. Providing information on new research reactors.
4. Providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants.
5. Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.
6. Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.

SECOND STEP: Seven Practical Measures, agreed on 9 February 2014

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.
3. Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor.
4. Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR-40 Reactor.
5. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab'ad Laser Centre.
6. Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran's extraction of uranium from phosphates.
7. Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran's stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

THIRD STEP: Five Practical Measures, agreed on 20 May 2014

1. Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
3. Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.
4. Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.
5. Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

Annex II

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOFs in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility
3. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Esfahan:

4. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
5. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
6. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
7. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
8. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
9. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
10. Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP)

Natanz:

11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
12. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

13. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

14. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)

Karaj:

15. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

16. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Darkhovin:

17. 360 MW Nuclear Power Plant

Shiraz:

18. 10 MW Fars Research Reactor (FRR)

LOFs:

Nine (all situated within hospitals)

Annex III

Table 1
Summary of UF_6 Production and Flows

	Date	*Quantity*	*Enrichment*
Produced at UCF	May 2015	550 000 kg	Natural
Produced by downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235	24 November 2014	7730 kg	Natural
Fed into FEP, PFEP and FFEP	May 2015	169 149.8 kg	Natural
Produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP	May 2015	14 821.1 kg	Up to 5%
Produced by downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235	20 July 2014	115.6 kg	Up to 5%
Fed into PFEP	20 January 2014	1 630.8 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at PFEP	20 January 2014	201.9 kg	Up to 20%
Fed into FFEP	20 January 2014	1 806.0 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at FFEP	20 January 2014	245.9 kg	Up to 20%

Table 2
Inventory of UF_6 Enriched up to 20% U-235

Produced at FFEP and PFEP	447.8 kg
Fed into conversion process	337.2 kg
Downblended	110.0 kg*
Stored as UF_6	0.6 kg

* The figure includes 1.6 kg that was previously downblended (GOV/2012/55, para. 10).

Table 3
Conversion at UCF

Conversion process	*Quantity produced*	*Transferred to FMP*
UF_6 (~3.4% U-235) into UO_2	24 kg U	24 kg U
Natural UOC into UO_2	13 792 kg U*	13 229 kg U

* Uranium content in material qualified for fuel fabrication.

Table 4
Conversion of UF_6 Enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 at FPFP

Feed quantity	*Quantity produced*
337.2 kg of UF_6 (227.6 kg U)	162.8 kg U

Table 5
Conversion of UF_6 into UO_2 at EUPP

Feed quantity	*Quantity produced*
6,319 kg of natural UF_6 (4262.3 kg U)	1,828.8 kg U*
2,720 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 (1,835.3 kg U)	151.0 kg U*

* The rest of the nuclear material is in different stages of the process.

Table 6
Fuel Manufacturing at FMP

Item	*Number produced*	*Enrichment*	*Item mass (g U)*	*Number irradiated*
Test fuel rod for IR-40 Reactor	3	Natural uranium	500	1
Test fuel rod	2	3.4%	500	–
Fuel rod assembly	2	3.4%	6 000	1
Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	1	Natural uranium	10 000	1
IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	36	Natural uranium	35 500	Not applicable
IR-40 fuel assembly	11	Natural uranium	56 500	–

Table 7
TRR Fuel Fabrication at FPFP

Item	*Number produced*	*Enrichment*	*Item mass (g U)*	*Present at TRR*	*Irradiated*
TRR test plate (Natural uranium)	4	Natural uranium	5	2	1
TRR test plate	5	19%	75	5	2
TRR control fuel assembly	9	19%	1 000	8	6
TRR standard fuel assembly	25	19%	1 400	21	14
Test assembly (with 8 plates)	1	19%	550	1	–

Annex IV

Update on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the Joint Plan of Action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013

1. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:

   i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;

   ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;

   iii. diluted — down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 — 108.4 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235;[80]

   iv. fed 100 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at FPFP for conversion into uranium oxide;

   v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF_6 at FPFP;

   vi. not made "any further advances" to its activities at FEP, FFEP or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;

   vii. provided an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor and concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the reactor[81] (based on the updated DIQ and the safeguards measures agreed on 5 May 2014);

   viii. fed 2720 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the EUPP for conversion into uranium oxide;[82]

   ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at PFEP, without accumulating enriched uranium;

   x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at TRR and the MIX Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;

   xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,[83] to the Saghand Uranium Mine[84] and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;[85]

   xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;

   xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and

[80] For details, see GOV/INF/2014/26, footnote 4.

[81] On 31 August 2014.

[82] The Agency also confirmed that, as of 23 May 2015, 151.0 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced from the 402.6 kg of uranium in the form of ammonium diuranate enriched up to 5% U-235 (see GOV/INF/2015/8, footnote 7).

[83] On 29 January 2014.

[84] On 6 May 2014.

[85] On 7 May 2014.

xiv. provided,[86] in relation to enhanced monitoring, the following:

- plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site;
- descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and
- information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

2. In addition, the Agency confirms that since 24 July 2014, Iran has:

i. used 44.5 kg of U_3O_8, converted from UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR;[87,88]

ii. used 0.084 kg of U_3O_8, converted from UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of miniature fuel plates for ^{99}Mo production;[89] and

iii. diluted about 4118 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.

[86] As of 20 April 2014: pursuant to Iran's undertaking to provide this information within three months of the JPA taking effect, i.e. 20 January 2014.

[87] On 25 November 2014, pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement, Iran temporarily stopped the operations for conversion and fuel manufacturing at FPFP in preparation for the Agency's verification of the PIT at this facility. The Agency's verification was carried out between 14 and 16 December 2014.

[88] The Agency has verified that, since 24 July 2014, an additional 10.4 kg of this U_3O_8 (6.2 kg prior to 24 November 2014 and 4.2 kg since that date), have been generated by and removed from the fuel fabrication process as scrap. Iran reported that this nuclear material, which remains at the facility, had not met the technical specification for fuel fabrication.

[89] In a letter dated 28 December 2014, Iran informed the Agency that FPFP was to start the production of miniature fuel plates for the MIX Facility for ^{99}Mo production.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2164 (2014), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2015 and requested me to report to it every three months on the implementation of the resolution and the Mission's mandate. The present report provides an update on major developments since my previous report, of 27 March 2015 (S/2015/219), and recommendations for the extension of the mandate of MINUSMA.

II. Political process

2. There have been significant developments in the inter-Malian dialogue since my most recent report. On 15 May, the Government, the Platform coalition of armed groups, composed of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance I (CMFPR-I), a faction of the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), a faction of Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) and the Groupe d'autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés (GATIA), and representatives of two of the Coordination coalition of armed groups, namely another faction of CPA and of CMFPR-II, signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process (Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger) in Bamako, in the presence of the international community and national stakeholders. The other movements of the Coordination which includes the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA), the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance II (CMFPR-II) and a faction of the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), did not sign the agreement, but they did initial it the previous day, on 14 May, in Algiers. Such developments constituted important progress, while dialogue continued with a view to securing the adhesion of all parties to the agreement. Those efforts, however, have been hampered by the serious deterioration of the security situation across the north of Mali since the end of April, particularly in Ménaka (Gao region), which saw ceasefire violations by all Malian parties and violent clashes between Platform and Coordination elements.

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Inter-Malian dialogue and reconciliation

3. Following the initialling of the draft agreement by the Government and the Platform on 1 March in Algiers, the mediation, comprising Algeria, the United Nations/MINUSMA, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and the Niger, continued its efforts to bring all parties to initial the draft agreement. On 17 March, a delegation of the international community travelled to Kidal to meet with representatives of the Coordination, who had gathered to consult with their constituency. During that visit, the Coordination submitted a list of observations to be considered and discussed prior to its initialling of the agreement. The mediation indicated that no further amendments to the draft peace agreement would be considered. On 18 March, during a press conference, the Minister of Digital Economy, Information and Communication and Government spokesman of Mali announced the Government's decision not to enter into further negotiations with the Coordination. Following discussions with the mediation, however, the Government later accepted to discuss implementation issues, subsequent to the initialling of the agreement by the Coordination.

4. The Government of Mali also organized sensitization activities relating to the agreement. On 31 March, the Minister of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction of the North, of the Government of Mali, visited the refugee camp of Tabarey-Barey in the Niger, where he presented the content of the draft agreement to Malian refugees there. On 4 and 6 April, the Minister of National Reconciliation travelled to Nouakchott and to the M'bera refugee camp in Mauritania to sensitize Malian communities there to matters relating to the agreement and to encourage their return once conditions would so permit. Meanwhile, popular demonstrations took place on 11, 12, 14 and 15 April in Kidal, Ménaka and Ber to denounce the Coordination's intention to initial the agreement.

5. Between 14 and 19 April, MINUSMA, in line with its mandate concerning the protection of civilians, which includes the mitigation of intercommunal violence, supported a peace caravan to Goundam Cercle. The initiative of elected and traditional local leaders, particularly the chief of the Kel-Antessar tribe, was undertaken to help restore trust between the communities of Goundam. Peaceful messages were disseminated to people in over 20 localities in the Cercle, including members of Arab, Peulh, Songhai and Tuareg communities, as well as representatives of the M'bera refugee camp in Mauritania. Activities included large public meetings in Bintagoungou, Douékiré, Goundam, Mbouna and Scale, as well as focus groups aimed at promoting reconciliation. The initiative helped foster dialogue between communities and improve confidence, in order to prepare for the reintegration and voluntary return of refugees from the M'bera refugee camp.

6. Following discussions held in Algiers on 4 April between my Special Representative in Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Mongi Hamdi, and the Secretary-General of MNLA, Bilal Ag Acherif, the latter indicated, in a letter addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, that the Coordination would be willing to initial the draft agreement, provided that consultations would be held on their outstanding observations on the text. On 6 April, Mr. Lamamra invited the parties to Algiers for an initialling ceremony, scheduled to take place on 15 April. On 10 April, however, the spokesperson of MNLA issued a communiqué on behalf

of the Coordination reiterating its refusal to initial the agreement "in its present form at that date". During further talks held in Algiers from 14 to 19 April, the Coordination delegation, led by the Secretary-General of MAA-Coordination, Sidi Ibrahim Ould Sidati, reaffirmed its commitment to initial and sign the agreement on the condition that a set of issues be addressed first, including guarantees from the mediation. In consultation with the Government of Mali, the mediation decided that further discussions would not be pursued and that a formal signature of the agreement would take place in Bamako on 15 May, to which all Malian parties would be invited. The Government of Mali thereafter transmitted invitations to the ceremony to national and international representatives.

7. Efforts to facilitate the adhesion of the Coordination to the agreement in time for the signing ceremony continued nonetheless. Following difficult and intense discussions that took place in Nouakchott, on 25 and 26 April, between my Special Representative and the leadership of the Coordination, Mr. Ag Acherif confirmed, in a letter addressed to my Special Representative on 26 April, that the Coordination would agree to initial the agreement prior to further consultations. That effort was set back on 27 April, however, when combatants from GATIA and MAA-Platform attacked and took control of Ménaka, a town Coordination forces had been occupying under the terms of the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014. The incident set off a series of retaliatory ceasefire violations by the Coordination, fuelling a spiral of violence by all sides that threatened to derail the peace process.

8. As detailed in the next section, MINUSMA immediately initiated contacts with the parties at all levels to defuse tensions and prevent a further escalation of violence. My Special Representative proposed a series of recommendations to end the wave of violence in the north, with a particular focus on the situation in Ménaka. The Coordination initially refused a new invitation to attend consultations in Algiers unless the Platform withdrew from Ménaka, but eventually agreed to travel to Algiers on 13 May, at the insistence of my Special Representative. On 14 May, the Coordination initialled the agreement in the presence of the mediation and other parties, while insisting that discussions be held with the Government before it would sign the agreement.

9. On 15 May, the formal signing ceremony of the agreement took place in Bamako. The ceremony was attended by 10 Heads of State and several representatives of governments and international organizations, as well as a significant number of national actors, including representatives from civil society, political parties, traditional and religious leaders from the northern and southern regions and former Heads of State and prime ministers. In addition to my Special Representative, I was represented by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Following consultations with the Security Council on 7 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations articulated, in a statement that he delivered on my behalf, the principles that would guide United Nations support for an agreement signed by only some of the parties, namely, that dialogue would continue, the agreement would remain open for signature by outstanding parties, ceasefire commitments would remain valid and efforts would be made to identify those elements of the agreement that could be viably implemented pending the signature of the agreement by all parties. Large demonstrations later took place, on 26 May, in Bamako and Goundam (Timbuktu region) and on 27 May in Timbuktu city, to express support for the peace agreement.

10. Following intense engagement by my Special Representative and other key stakeholders, a series of consultations took place, from 27 May to 5 June, between the mediation and all Malian parties in Algiers on a two-step road map with a view to facilitating the adhesion of Coordination to the agreement. First, the road map aims to mitigate the prevailing security situation by re-establishing ceasefires, building on arrangements for Ménaka and reaffirming the parties' commitment to a cessation of hostilities throughout the country. Second, the road map consists of consultations between the parties on the modalities for the implementation of the agreement, including the establishment of the *Comité de suivi de l'accord*, the implementation framework foreseen by the agreement. On 5 June the Coordination, the Government of Mali and the mediation signed a summary of preparatory consultations on the implementation of the peace agreement and a ceasefire arrangement that inter alia provided for the disengagement of the parties from Ménaka. The Platform refused to sign those two documents.

III. Security, stabilization and protection of civilians

11. During the reporting period, the frequency, intensity and geographical spread of clashes and attacks increased, especially in the period leading up to and immediately following the ceremony for the signature of the agreement held on 15 May. Tensions escalated between the Platform and the Coordination, both seeking opportunities to assert influence and make territorial and political gains. Clashes and movements of armed groups mainly occurred in the Gao and Timbuktu regions, but also increasingly towards the south, in Mopti and Ségou regions, and led to significant displacement of civilians.

Clashes between and attacks by compliant armed groups

12. On 27 April, GATIA and MAA-Platform elements unexpectedly attacked and took over the town of Ménaka from the Coordination, which had been occupying it under the terms of the 23 May 2014 ceasefire agreement. Elements of the Malian armed forces, previously sheltered in the co-located Malian armed forces-MINUSMA camp, left the premises and were active both inside and outside the town. Fighting between armed groups continued in the following days on the outskirts of Ménaka and in key locations in the area. MINUSMA deployed joint investigation teams to assess the fighting and its consequences and supported the deployment of a joint observation and verification team from Gao on 29 April. MINUSMA immediately reinforced its military presence in the town so as to deter further violence.

13. The Coordination retaliated by launching a series of attacks against Government- or Platform-held localities in Timbuktu region. On 28 April, four Coordination vehicles were observed in the close vicinity of Timbuktu. The Coordination leadership in Ber requested the departure of the Malian defence and security forces from Timbuktu and indicated its intention to enter the city in order to oust them. As the parties reinforced their positions, MINUSMA engaged with and obtained the commitment of the local Coordination leadership not to enter Timbuktu. In the following days, several attacks against the Malian defence and security forces were conducted in Timbuktu and Mopti regions and resulted in four

civilians being killed and nine being injured; 19 members of the Malian defence and security forces were killed and 15 were injured; and eight persons were abducted. Three elements of the Coordination were killed and four were wounded. In addition, 12 inmates escaped from the prison in Diré (Timbuktu region). Looting and stealing from the civilian population by Coordination elements were also reported in Ténenkou (Mopti region). Attacks by the Coordination against other armed groups were reported in Timbuktu region, including kidnappings, looting and arson.

14. With the aim of encouraging a return to the observance of the ceasefire, the Force Commander of MINUSMA organized an extraordinary meeting of the Mixed Technical Commission on Security on 2 May, in Gao, with the participation of Government, Platform and Coordination representatives. The findings of two joint observation and verification team missions conducted in Timbuktu and Ménaka on 29 April were presented, and it was concluded that violations of the ceasefire agreements had been committed on all sides. Further joint observation and verification teams were sent to Bintagoungou, Goundam and Leré. MINUSMA proposed a disengagement plan for Ménaka, which provided for a pullback of all armed groups from the town and the assumption by MINUSMA of responsibility for security in the town and the establishment of a protective "red line" 5 km north of the town. The Platform rejected the proposal, remaining in Ménaka, while Coordination representatives questioned the Mission's impartiality in denying them access to the town as provided for in previous ceasefire arrangements.

15. On 8 May, an armed confrontation between Ganda Koy elements and individuals suspected of criminal activity took place in Arbichi village, 42 km from Gourma-Rharous (Timbuktu region), resulting in the death of one suspected criminal and the arrest of another, who was handed over to the Malian armed forces and taken into custody in Timbuktu. The clash triggered a series of incidents, with the Coordination storming villages located along the Niger River, causing the displacement of people from the northern, Coordination-controlled bank of the river to the southern bank, controlled by the Malian armed forces and Ganda Koy elements. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 1 June, 59,565 persons have been displaced in recent weeks as a result of the insecurity.

16. Starting on 13 May, fighting around Ménaka resumed, with Coordination and Platform elements clashing at In Kadeouane, approximately 80 km north of Ménaka. Members of the Malian armed forces left their camp and took up positions within and north of the town, where they have remained in defensive positions since 15 May. MINUSMA continued to advocate for the disengagement of all Malian parties from the town and communicated to the Coordination that any offensive movement towards Ménaka would be interpreted as a threat to the civilian population. Two further efforts to convene the CTMS to discuss the Mission's Ménaka proposal failed when the Platform, despite commitments to the mediation team, refused to attend. On 26 May, some 1,000 protesters gathered in front of the Mission's camp in Ménaka, demanding a meeting with the Government and MINUSMA leadership. MINUSMA also received a letter from the town's mayor, requesting MINUSMA to expand its authority in the town and to enlarge the proposed protection zone up to 30 km. MINUSMA continues to provide medical evacuation of injured combatants from the area.

Asymmetric and extremist attacks

17. Violent extremist and criminal activities increased in all northern regions and southward into Mopti and Ségou regions. The incursion of extremist elements and the targeting of local authorities and of suspected informants of the Malian defence and security forces in Mopti region, as well as attacks in Bamako, were particularly worrisome developments.

18. Attacks against local administration officials in Mopti region led several of them, including seven sub-prefects and one mayor, to leave their posts. On 26 April, a vehicle carrying the prefect of Youwarou and the sub-prefect of Dogo hit an improvised explosive device or mine on the Dogo-Déké axis; no casualties were reported. On 29 May, four rockets were fired in the direction of the airport in Gao by unknown assailants, without causing casualties or damage.

19. Attacks against civilians also intensified, leading to 9 civilians being killed and at least 14 being injured by improvised explosive devices or mines and, for the first time in Gao, by a rocket attack. Numerous acts of retaliation, abductions and threats against civilians were also registered in Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions. During the reporting period, two Malians and one Romanian were kidnapped. From mid-March to 20 April, logistics convoys, mainly of MINUSMA and its suppliers, faced several attacks, including on the Ménaka-Ansongo (Gao region), Timbuktu-Goundam (Timbuktu region), Gao-Almoustarat (Gao region) and Gao-Gossi (Gao and Timbuktu regions) axes. Those attacks resulted in five civilian contractors being killed and three being injured, while five vehicles were damaged or destroyed by gunfire and mine attacks. In response to the intensification of attacks on civilian vehicles, on 27 April, the Malian armed forces began escorting civilian transport vehicles on the Timbuktu-Goundam, Goundam-Tonka (Timbuktu region), Timbuktu-Douentza (Timbuktu and Mopti regions) and Gao-Gossi-Douentza (Gao and Timbuktu regions) axes.

20. Attacks against the Malian defence and security forces using improvised explosive devices also increased during the reporting period. Five incidents were recorded, resulting in two uniformed personnel being killed and nine being injured.

21. MINUSMA was the target of numerous attacks, mostly involving the use of improvised explosive devices, but also encountered one mortar attack in Kidal. Twelve peacekeepers were injured, in multiple attacks, and nine additional peacekeepers were injured on 15 April, when an attacker attempted to break into the Mission's camp in Ansongo (Gao region) with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and detonated the device outside the camp. On 17 April, Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack.

22. In addition, on 16 May, an attack with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was launched against a force convoy of MINUSMA that had established its overnight position in the vicinity of Almoustarat (Gao region), leading to the minor injury of one peacekeeper. On 20 May, an armed attacker unsuccessfully tried to set fire to a vehicle of the Mission parked outside the house of MINUSMA military personnel in Bamako, then opened fire on a local guard, the house and other vehicles, and threw two hand grenades, which did not explode. On 22 May, 11 mortar shells were fired at the Mission's camp in Ber (Timbuktu region), landing 5 m away from the camp, without causing casualties. On 25 May, a shooting incident in Bamako, which Malian authorities and MINUSMA are still investigating,

resulted in one peacekeeper being killed and a second being injured. Meanwhile, on 28 May, an armoured vehicle escorting a MINUSMA convoy, including the Force Commander and Police Commissioner, hit a mine or improvised explosive device about 20 km east of Timbuktu; three peacekeepers were injured and the vehicle was destroyed.

Protection of civilians

23. While civilians in northern Mali were rarely deliberately targeted by attacks, they suffered collateral damage, including from improvised explosive devices and mines, as well as rockets. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service, 50 civilian victims of such incidents (including 9 who were killed and 41 who were injured) have been registered during the period under review. In addition to civilian casualties, improvised explosive devices, mines and explosive remnants of war hindered freedom of movement and affected access to services and economic opportunities.

24. The Mission implemented its protection of civilians mandate through a variety of measures. In order to respond to the growing violence in the Timbuktu region, MINUSMA was in direct contact with the Coordination leadership and local authorities to try and defuse the situation. MINUSMA further organized assessment missions to Bintagoungou, Diré, Léré and Goundam (Timbuktu region), following clashes in those localities, so as to engage with and reassure the population as well as to evaluate the security situation and its impact on civilians. MINUSMA immediately initiated investigations of the sites of attacks in support of local security authorities. In several cases, MINUSMA assisted with the evacuation of wounded civilian victims, such as in Ansongo (Gao region) on 15 April. In Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, the Mine Action Service completed explosive search and clearance operations in public buildings, as well as in private houses, which were previously occupied by armed groups, enabling the safe re-establishment of State authority and the return of displaced people. During the reporting period, the Mine Action Service conducted risk education sessions on explosive hazards for 15,025 people and education sessions on small arms and light weapons for over 8,700 people in communities at risk in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions.

25. Despite being constrained by the need to allocate significant resources to the protection of MINUSMA camps and escorting logistics convoys, the force deployed long-range patrols to areas of heightened tension, such as Ténenkou (Mopti region) in order to deter further clashes and reassure civilians. Similarly, MINUSMA police undertook long-range as well as coordinated patrols with Malian security forces to reassure the population. In Ménaka (Gao region), the force deployed 200 additional troops, as of 28 April, to reinforce the existing MINUSMA presence and deter attacks on civilian-populated areas.

IV. Human rights protection

26. The Mission documented violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law during the period under review. A total of 19 civilians were killed in instances of summary executions (9 civilians), indiscriminate mortar

and rocket attacks (8 civilians) or during armed clashes by parties to the conflict (2 civilians) in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Ségou regions.

27. MINUSMA undertook examinations of alleged summary or arbitrary executions of civilians. Three civilians were victims of summary executions by unidentified individuals for alleged cooperation with Malian armed forces in the Ségou region. On 29 March, unidentified armed men on motorbikes entered the village of Tokala (Ségou region) and summarily executed two persons perceived to be informants to the Malian armed forces. On 22 April, the chief of Dogo village (Mopti region) was shot and assassinated by two men on a motorbike, while in the market, while on 12 April, 1 km south of the same village, a young Peulh, perceived to be an informant of the Malian armed forces, was assaulted by four armed men, strangled and left for dead.

28. In the context of clashes between elements from all Malian parties in Tin Hama (Gao region), six civilian men, all belonging to the Tuareg Kel Essouk group and including a humanitarian worker, were executed on 21 May. Other incidents that raised serious protection concerns include threats made against people cooperating with MINUSMA and the Malian State in Djenné and Douentza (Mopti region).

29. As of 15 May, 219 conflict-related detainees remained in detention by the State, either in Bamako or the regions. Of those detainees, 22 appeared on the lists submitted by the Coordination for release within the framework of the confidence-building measures of article 18 of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement. In April, two such detainees were released.

30. The Coordination and the Platform continued to detain fighters of opposing groups as well as members of the Malian defence and security forces captured during operations. On 22 May in Ber, Timbuktu region, MINUSMA facilitated the release of 10 members of Ganda Koy and CMFPR-I, who had been held by the Coordination since 28 April, while the Coordination continues to detain two members of the Malian defence and security forces. On 27 April in Ménaka, the Platform captured nine Coordination fighters, who are now held in Tabankort. Since their transfer to Tabankort, MINUSMA has lost access to them. In Kidal region, the Coordination continues to hold one GATIA fighter captured on 20 January in Tabankort, while two more GATIA fighters captured in the same operation were released in April. The Coordination also continues to detain 16 Malian armed forces members captured on 22 May in Tessit, Gao region. MINUSMA has not been able to establish conclusively the number, grounds and conditions of detention of all persons held by armed groups, owing to limited information and a lack of access.

Conflict-related sexual violence

31. During the reporting period, MINUSMA documented 23 cases of conflict-related sexual violence. A judge was appointed to conduct investigations into a number of cases filed by non-governmental organizations on behalf of victims of sexual violence. Meanwhile, 33 additional complaints of grave human rights violations, including acts of conflict-related sexual violence, were filed on 6 March at the court of first instance in Timbuktu against 15 members of armed groups. This was the third such collective complaint filed since November 2014. Meanwhile, only limited services are available to victims of sexual violence. MINUSMA is closely monitoring the process.

Child protection

32. During the reporting period, 16 new cases of child recruitment by MNLA, GATIA, CMFPR-II, Ganda-Izo and MAA-Platform in Ansongo and Intilit (Gao region) and in Timbuktu region, as well as by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in Mopti region, were recorded. Among those recruited children, 15 were arrested and detained by the Malian defence and security forces, some for as long as four months. Of those 15 children, 10 were released during March and April, bringing the current number of children detained for their alleged association with armed groups to 10. MINUSMA and UNICEF conducted six visits to detention centres in Bamako and met with officials of the ministries of Women, Child and Family Affairs, of Defence and Former Combatants, and of Justice, to ensure the swift release of the detained children.

33. MINUSMA and UNICEF verified that nine schools were being used by armed groups, while six additional schools were reported as being used by such groups. The vocational training centre of Gao, which was vacated by MINUSMA Force on 6 December 2014, has been rehabilitated.

V. Re-establishment of State authority

34. There was limited progress in the re-establishment of State authority in the north during the period under review. As of 23 April, the presence of State representatives in Gao region was as follows: one governor; four out of five prefects; and 18 out of 25 sub-prefects, mostly in the urban centres of Ansongo, Bourem and Gao. In Mopti region, there was one governor; all eight prefects; and 43 out of 108 sub-prefects. In Timbuktu region, there was one governor; all five prefects; and 17 out of 31 sub-prefects. All Kidal State officials (one governor, four prefects and 11 sub-prefects) relocated from Bamako to Gao in mid-February, pending their redeployment to Kidal. The overall number of sub-prefects present at their duty stations, however, further decreased from 55 to 43 sub-prefects (12 left their posts, owing to insecurity).

35. Despite serious concerns about their security, additional judges, prosecutors and prison personnel returned to the north. In Gao region, the public prosecutor at the court of first instance, the president of the tribunal and the investigating judge returned and resumed their duties on 30 March. The new president of Timbuktu's tribunal of first instance, a judge and the prosecutor arrived in the second half of March. The arrival of magistrates is expected to help tackle the exceptionally high number of prisoners currently in pretrial detention. Following the signature of a ministerial order to deploy additional staff to the north, MINUSMA began supporting the Ministry of Justice for the deployment of approximately 30 corrections officers to the north, so as to address the chronic understaffing in prisons.

36. MINUSMA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to join efforts to strengthen judicial and penitentiary institutions in the north. On 20 March, MINUSMA police inaugurated and handed over rehabilitated and equipped stations to the gendarmerie and national police in Gao. On 21 March, the Mine Action Service completed the rehabilitation of three armouries in Gao city, in support of one police and two gendarmerie stations. On 24 March, the *Maison centrale d'arrêt* of Timbuktu reopened, following the completion of its renovation

through a quick-impact project of MINUSMA. UNDP completed the rehabilitation of the tribunal of Gourma-Rharous on 21 April and provided equipment to the regional directorates of penitentiary institutions in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu. In addition, MINUSMA and UNDP, through the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections mechanism, helped the Government to review its justice and corrections reform plan.

37. The Mission continued to actively engage with and support representatives of the Malian defence and security forces, the parliamentary commission on security, defence and civil protection and civil society organizations involved in security sector reform. MINUSMA reached an agreement to support the Ministry of Defence and Former Combatants in the implementation of the military guidance and planning law for the period 2015-2019, which was adopted on 13 February, starting with a sensitization and planning workshop in Bamako. MINUSMA, in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute, organized a two-day meeting at the Bamako Peacekeeping Training Centre, on 31 March and 1 April, to sensitize Malian civil society actors regarding their role in security sector reform and the Mission's support to the process. In addition, a pilot project to rehabilitate border infrastructure at Labezanga, on the border between Mali and the Niger, was finalized.

38. In March and April, UNDP supported the Government through capacity-building activities on security sector reform, including by training 575 officers of the national police, gendarmerie, civil protection and National Guard, 10 per cent of whom were women.

VI. Humanitarian assistance

39. The deterioration of the security environment in northern Mali continued to hamper the implementation of projects and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded a significant increase in incidents affecting humanitarian access, with 30 such incidents recorded between 1 January and 23 April 2015, compared to a total of 23 incidents in 2014. Approximately half of the incidents were linked to violence against personnel, goods and humanitarian infrastructure, while the others were linked to military and armed group operations and hostilities. MINUSMA provided security and escort to humanitarian actors in the regions in order to enable them to assess needs and provide necessary assistance. Four cases of violence against humanitarian workers, assets and facilities occurred during the reporting period, including the killing of one staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross by an extremist group in Gao region, on 30 March. Another three cases linked to general insecurity and criminality led to the temporary suspension of activities by non-governmental organizations and/or their withdrawal in Mopti and Timbuktu regions.

40. As of 1 June, 59,565 additional internally displaced persons were reported across the regions of Timbuktu (54,441), Gao (3,041) and Mopti (2,083), since the surge in clashes in northern Mali on 27 April. This brings the total to 102,757. Some 732 new refugees crossed into the neighbouring countries of Mauritania (236), the Niger (238) and Burkina Faso (258), adding to the 137,500 Malian refugees previously registered in neighbouring countries by UNHCR since the crisis started in early 2012.

41. The results of the harmonized framework, the analytical tool used to standardize evaluation systems for food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel, for March 2015, indicated that at least 410,000 people would be in need of immediate food assistance, from April to August 2015, and that some 2.7 million people would be moderately food insecure. The World Food Programme (WFP) supported 90,000 internally displaced persons, returnees and individuals affected by economic and environmental stresses with emergency food assistance, in March, and 130,000 individuals in April and May. WFP plans to scale up its assistance to provide at least 350,000 beneficiaries with emergency food assistance as the lean season approaches. It also provided life-saving treatment to about 50,000 children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from moderate to acute malnutrition in March and April and planned to assist 55,000 malnourished people in May.

42. Only 27 per cent of the $377 million funding requirement for the common humanitarian response plan in Mali for 2015 was mobilized as of early June, putting the implementation of key humanitarian activities at risk this year.

VII. Early recovery and development

43. Despite the deteriorating security situation, several successful initiatives were undertaken through MINUSMA quick-impact projects to help increase the confidence, resilience and recovery of local communities. Initiatives ranged from livelihood development and restoring access to water and electricity, to the rehabilitation of government structures in those areas under government control. Since 20 March, six projects were completed, 31 were ongoing and funding was approved for an additional 55. The total budget for these 92 projects reached $3 million.

44. On 11 May, MINUSMA and the United Nations Office for Project Services began the assessment of 16 community violence reduction project proposals in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu, aimed at preventing the further recruitment of youth at risk by armed and criminal groups and at contributing to confidence-building in affected communities.

45. The United Nations country team began implementing four approved Peacebuilding Fund projects in Gao and Timbuktu regions on: (a) peace education in northern Mali; (b) strengthening the capacity of women and youth and their resilience to conflict; (c) durable solutions for the peaceful reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; and (d) access to justice for female victims of sexual- and gender-based violence.

46. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continued its coordination of the local reconstruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu, with the support of MINUSMA. Rehabilitation work for three private libraries of ancient manuscripts in the historic centre of Timbuktu continued through a quick-impact project facilitated by MINUSMA. On 8 April, MINUSMA Force visited the archaeological site of Es-Souk (Kidal region) and confirmed allegations of looting by the local population. Es-Souk is on the tentative list of sites in Mali for inclusion on the World Heritage List of UNESCO.

VIII. Operationalization of the Mission

47. As of 1 June, MINUSMA had deployed almost 83 per cent of all authorized civilian staff: 84 per cent of international posts; 81 per cent of United Nations Volunteers; and 85 per cent of all national posts. In terms of gender distribution, 32 per cent of international posts, 34 per cent of volunteer positions and 21 per cent of national posts were occupied by women.

48. As of 1 June, the strength of the Mission's police component stood at 1,055 personnel, reaching 73 per cent of its authorized strength of 1,440, with 65 per cent of individual police officers (8 per cent of them women) and 76 per cent of the formed police unit personnel (3 per cent of them women) deployed (see annex). At the end of April, one of the formed police units stationed in Gao was repatriated.

49. As of 1 June, the strength of the Mission's military component stood at 9,043 troops (including 244 military staff officers) out of an authorized strength of 11,200, representing 81 per cent of the authorized strength for military personnel. Women represent 2 per cent of the Force. The Force is composed of manoeuvre units (66 per cent), enablers (29 per cent) and force multipliers (5 per cent) and is deployed in Bamako (10 per cent), in Sector West (Timbuktu and Mopti regions) (26 per cent), in Sector East (Gao region) (36 per cent) and in Sector North (Kidal region) (28 per cent).

50. Efforts to achieve full operating capability continued. Over the reporting period, tactical military unarmed unmanned aerial systems, complete with a specially constructed runway, and three armed helicopters, were deployed in Timbuktu. The Mission anticipates the deployment of two additional medium-range helicopter units in Kidal and Timbuktu by August. However, MINUSMA still awaits the deployment of a second infantry battalion, outstanding for more than 16 months, and two force protection companies. A troop-contributing country capable of providing an additional armed helicopter unit has yet to be identified. Concerns remain regarding contingency-owned equipment for most of the infantry units.

51. The persistent targeting of convoy movements in northern Mali by criminal and/or violent extremist actors, as outlined in paragraph 19 above, continues to pose a serious threat to the ability of the Mission to deliver supplies to personnel and bases in the north and causes significant delays to construction projects. The deteriorating security situation, the lack of appropriate security vehicles, the unavailability of alternative supply routes to northern Mali and the continued non-functioning of Kidal airport as a result of vandalism have had a negative impact on the ability of both the Mission and its contractors to ensure a timely resupply of its northern deployments, especially in Aguelhok, Kidal and Tessalit. The Mission continues to experience water scarcity in the Kidal area and is working through its engineering contractors to address the situation. The increasingly critical situation in terms of support operations in northern Mali was assessed in the context of the review of the mission concept, which is addressed below.

52. During the reporting period, MINUSMA continued to implement its counter-improvised explosive device strategy and action plan to improve the safety and security of MINUSMA personnel. The two MINUSMA explosive ordnance disposal and route verification companies conducted 17 missions in support of convoy movements, daily road clearance tasks and post-blast investigations, as well as neutralizing improvised explosive devices and removing unexploded ordnance.

In-country training on improvised explosive device safety response was provided to 156 MINUSMA military and police personnel, as well as training in the use of individual first aid kits, for 174 personnel, with a particular focus on infantry units. Predeployment training in the field of counter-improvised explosive device measures also began for forthcoming and rotating infantry units, with training for 863 troops completed during the reporting period.

IX. Financial aspects

53. I have submitted to the General Assembly, for its consideration, a note seeking additional funding for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 in the amount of $80.3 million (see A/69/828), in addition to the amount of $830.7 million previously appropriated for the maintenance of the Mission for the same period under the terms of General Assembly resolution 68/259 B, in order to enable the Mission to support a counter-improvised explosive device action plan, including the counter-improvised explosive device training for MINUSMA Force and police contingents, improve Force protection capabilities and enhance the national counter-improvised explosive device capacities of the Malian defence and security forces. At the same time, my budget proposal for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, amounting to $936.1 million gross, is currently before the Fifth Committee for review and consideration (see A/69/784). Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSMA beyond 30 June 2015, the cost for maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2016 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

54. As at 29 May 2015, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to $34.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,868.8 million.

55. As at 30 April 2015, amounts owed to troop and formed police contributors totalled some $113.8 million. Reimbursement of troop/formed police costs has been made for the period up to 28 February 2015, while reimbursement of the costs for contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2014, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

X. Mission concept

56. With a view to informing the Security Council's consideration of the renewal of the Mission's mandate and in the light of the changed political and security environment in Mali since 2014, MINUSMA undertook a review of its mission concept of October 2013. It will be finalized and approved by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in July.

57. The revised draft mission concept has identified the following goal, towards which all integrated efforts should be directed: "on the basis of a political settlement, conditions are being established for legitimate and functioning State authorities to provide basic security and services to the population". Three core Mission objectives were identified to reach this end state: (a) a sustainable and credible peace process, supported by regional actors, that includes processes at the national and subnational levels, to foster a viable peace agreement and its

implementation; and (b) security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process. This would require (c) the full operational capacity of MINUSMA, including the capacity to protect and sustain the Mission and conduct priority tasks. The protection of civilians and effective public communication are identified as cross-cutting priority tasks.

58. In pursuit of those objectives and in order to maximize the positive impact of the Mission's limited resources, MINUSMA would focus its efforts in five key geographical areas surrounding Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti and Timbuktu. A multidimensional and integrated approach, tailored to the specific political, security, governance, humanitarian and development conditions of each area, would be elaborated, with resources aligned in support of area-driven efforts. MINUSMA would continue to engage closely with Malian, international, regional and United Nations partners. The draft Mission Concept is aligned with the United Nations Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework and the benchmarking exercise endorsed by the Government of Mali.

59. With a view to supporting effective mandate implementation, the revised draft Mission Concept envisages that deployments in the current 16 sites will be oriented in support of the three core objectives and priority geographical areas identified in paragraphs 57 and 58 above, taking into account the degree of operational support available. There would be locations where all Mission components would have a continuous presence; sites that consist of military and police formed units, with provisions for the temporary deployment of civilians; and bases intended for only a military or formed police presence, in austere conditions, that would enable expeditionary movements for larger military units.

60. This more targeted approach to MINUSMA deployment would lead to a significantly increased demand on the Mission's flexibility and mobility, particularly with respect to convoy escorts, long-range patrols and aviation capabilities. In particular, MINUSMA would need to be able to sustain itself, ensuring access to the main supply routes as well as main population centres. This would require a reconfiguration of MINUSMA military and police assets so as to ensure that military logistics capabilities are enhanced and support the Mission in areas non-permissive for civilian contractual support. It would also require a greater emphasis on sufficiently equipped military and formed police units, as well as enhanced protection. The Mission's progress in deterring and reducing the threat of mines and other attacks using improvised explosives on Mission personnel illustrates the impact that can be achieved by ensuring that units have the appropriate equipment, training and procedures to operate in asymmetric environments. A qualitative rather than a quantitative approach will be pursued in order to ensure that the Mission has the mobility and flexibility it requires, that can be sustained in remote areas.

61. As a temporary measure, MINUSMA is putting together innovative "survivability packages" to improve the operational status of some contingents, until the capabilities envisioned in the respective statements of unit requirements are achieved, either organically or by drawing on support from other deployed units. The packages will include services relating to the provision of purified water, electricity and minor engineering. In the longer term, however, non-performing units will have to be reviewed and replaced so as to enable the Mission to achieve the robust flexibility and mobility essential for its continued presence in and access

to the north. Other efforts under way to strengthen the performance of military and police units include enhanced in-mission training and exercises. The Mission is also engaging closely with its contractors to ensure that their transport capabilities meet the qualitative requirements to operate along austere and insecure supply routes.

XI. Observations

62. The signing of the peace and reconciliation agreement by the Government of Mali and some of the armed groups on 15 May in Bamako was a critical milestone in the inter-Malian dialogue. I congratulate the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups for taking this important step forward. I am grateful for the dedicated efforts of Algeria and the members of the mediation, as well as those of the broader international community, that have encouraged and supported the peace process, starting with the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement, of 18 June 2013, and the Algiers process since July 2014. The presence of so many Heads of State and representatives of Governments and international organizations at the signing ceremony in Bamako reflects the unprecedented level of engagement of the international community in the peace process.

63. Ultimately, the responsibility for peace lies with the Malians themselves. Continued and sustainable progress towards peace and reconciliation requires the genuine commitment and engagement of the Malian parties. An inclusive peace process, supported by all parties to the conflict, is the only way to achieve the political settlement to which all parties have declared their commitment. It is also a prerequisite for addressing the insecurity, criminality, limited governance, humanitarian needs and underdevelopment that threatens an increasingly broader swathe of Mali and its population. The Coordination's initialling of the peace agreement on 14 May is a hopeful step, but it now needs to take the next step. I urge the leadership of the Coordination to be mindful of their responsibilities to the communities they seek to represent and to sign the agreement without further delay.

64. The violence that has spread and intensified in the run-up to and since 15 May is a clear indication of the risks that Mali will continue to face if dialogue is interrupted. I am deeply concerned by the numerous violations of the ceasefire that have taken place in northern Mali in the past weeks, by all armed movements, including the takeover of Ménaka by the Platform on 27 April. The current violence is increasingly targeting civilians and local authorities and is leading to serious abuses of human rights by all sides. Thousands have been displaced from their homes. The signature of the peace agreement cannot provide a licence to any party to pursue military options. I urge all parties to abide by the existing ceasefire agreements and declarations on the cessation of hostilities and to ensure their continued participation in the mechanisms established to oversee their implementation.

65. In the light of the urgency of the current situation, my Special Representative, in collaboration with the mediation, proposed a twofold road map, first, to ensure a global cessation of hostilities in the northern regions and second, to discuss practical arrangements for the implementation of the peace agreement and to clarify the parties' respective observations on the agreement. Consultations on these two elements, and the signing by the Government of Mali and the Coordination of documents on the implementation of the peace agreement and on ceasefire

arrangements to address, inter alia, the situation in Ménaka, represent a significant advance of the inter-Malian peace process. As a consequence, on 5 June, the Coordination indicated that it will proceed to sign the peace agreement. I very much welcome this. I regret, however, that the Platform refused to sign these painstakingly negotiated arrangements and I urge the group to do so in the coming days.

66. Looking forward, I encourage both signatories and non-signatories, supported by the mediation, to focus on implementation modalities and on guarantees that could reassure all parties that their concerns can be addressed in the implementation phase. It will take the commitment and good faith of all parties to identify and start implementing elements of the agreement that contribute to building confidence and trust among the parties as well as providing tangible benefits for communities throughout Mali. The polarization of the Malian population is fast becoming one of the tragedies and future concerns of this conflict. I urge all parties to collectively explain the peace process to the population so as to ensure public buy-in and foster genuine national reconciliation at all levels. I also strongly encourage the Government to do its utmost to deliver security and basic services in those areas where it is present so as to reassure the population of its full commitment to the well-being of its citizens.

67. At this critical juncture, the provision of continued coherent support by the mediation and the international community will be essential to reassure the parties that an inclusive political settlement is achievable. International support and financial resources will be critical to enable practical implementation and early wins. The donor community will need to be engaged to support the delivery of the promise of economic development held out by this agreement.

68. I recommend that the Security Council give consideration to refocusing the Mission's mandate as follows: first, MINUSMA good offices efforts could be directed towards facilitating and supporting dialogue with and among all stakeholders to encourage the full adhesion of all parties to the agreement and its concerted implementation. Efforts to facilitate dialogue towards reconciliation and social cohesion at the local and national levels could be reinforced by outreach to and activities in support of local authorities, community and religious leaders and civil society groups. Such efforts could help prevent the further increase of intercommunal tensions and contribute to building confidence among the population. To this effect, I encourage donors to generously contribute to the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali, which is managed by MINUSMA.

69. Second, MINUSMA could continue to prioritize security and stabilization as part of efforts to enable progress in the peace process. This could include an enhanced role for MINUSMA in monitoring and supervising the observance of ceasefires, including through strengthened ceasefire mechanisms, confidence-building measures and proactive engagement with all armed groups. Effective monitoring and reporting will involve all of the Mission's components in preventing and investigating potential violations of agreed ceasefire arrangements, as well as close engagement with all participating armed elements. To reinforce this effort, the Security Council may wish to consider the introduction of sanctions against the perpetrators of ceasefire violations. To this end, I would recommend that the Council authorize the deployment of 40 military observers, in addition to the current military authorized strength, to support MINUSMA monitoring and supervision of

ceasefires agreed between the Malian parties. Human rights monitoring and promotion, operational support for community violence reduction activities and for efforts to combat impunity, as well as counter-explosives action and risk education and robust action to protect civilians, in those instances where they are under imminent threat of physical violence, could help support the re-establishment of a more stable environment, which is essential for facilitating dialogue at all levels.

70. The third priority area of engagement could be in supporting the parties' progressive and consensual implementation of the peace agreement. As the only member of the international mediation with a presence in the north, MINUSMA will have a lead role to play through its function as the secretariat of the Comité de suivi de l'accord, as well as in the implementation of specific provisions of the agreement on the ground. It can assist the parties in identifying and prioritizing those implementation steps that would help to build confidence, encourage the adhesion of outstanding parties and promote the inclusive, concerted and complete implementation of the agreement. Such steps could include measures to promote the justice and reconciliation components of the agreement, while also supporting the parties in elaborating road maps and frameworks to address the security and defence reform provisions of the agreement, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. This will require presence, patient dialogue and sustained engagement, which MINUSMA field presence can help to provide.

71. The recent increase in attacks against humanitarian partners raises serious concern, as they obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. I call on all parties to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian access and humanitarian space, and to disassociate themselves from those perpetrating such attacks. Continued engagement and support by MINUSMA to ensure timely and unhindered humanitarian access will remain an essential Mission task.

72. Northern Mali is an extremely difficult environment in which to operate. MINUSMA is likely to continue to face significant security and operational challenges in the near future. Violent extremism, transnational organized crime and banditry will still pose significant threats to ongoing stabilization efforts. I call on Mali, the region and all international partners to continue to enhance efforts to address these threats and to strengthen capacities to enhance border security.

73. Meanwhile, it is imperative that the units provided by troop- and police-contributing countries have the capacities and capabilities required to operate safely and effectively in such environments. For this reason, I am not proposing, at this point in time, an increase in the Mission's military and police authorized strength, beyond the 40 military observers referred to in paragraph 69 above, but I am proposing a reconfiguration of their capabilities to improve their mobility, their ability to proactively monitor and support ceasefires and confidence-building, and their ability to protect and sustain themselves and the Mission. I call on bilateral partners to support the deployment of contingents to Mali, including by providing prior training and the necessary equipment.

74. The attacks against MINUSMA and its contractors are unacceptable and must stop forthwith. I strongly condemn these barbaric acts and express my deepest condolences to the families of victims of these crimes as well as to the Government of Mali and the Governments of the countries of origin of the United Nations peacekeepers who have lost their lives. I reiterate my appeal for the crimes to be

investigated and punished in earnest. I am grateful for continued coordination between MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane, in line with their respective mandates, and for the medical evacuation and essential assistance that the French forces continue to provide to MINUSMA.

75. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate for a period of one year, until 30 June 2016, with an increased authorized military strength of 11,240 personnel, including the recommended addition of 40 military observers, and maintaining the currently authorized police strength of 1,440 personnel, while also refocusing the mandate of MINUSMA, as outlined above.

76. Given the fluid environment in which the future of MINUSMA is being considered, flexibility and responsiveness will be essential. If and when progress is made in the peace process, consideration may need to be given to additional resources and tasks in support of particular implementation activities. To that end, I encourage the Security Council to remain actively engaged in support of the inter-Malian peace process and to consider the periodic review of the Mission's mandate in support thereto.

77. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Mali, Mongi Hamdi, and to all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel in Mali, for their continuing hard work in very difficult conditions. I would also like to express my gratitude to all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions in support of peace and stability in Mali.

Annex

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at 1 June 2015

	Military component (staff officers and units)			*Police component*								
				Individual police officers			*Formed police units*			*Total police*		
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Bangladesh	1 583	–	1 583	–	–	–	140	–	140	140	–	140
Benin	256	–	256	27	1	28	140	–	140	167	1	168
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	857	14	871	20	2	22	–	–	–	20	2	22
Burundi	–	–	–	15	–	15	–	–	–	15	–	15
Cambodia	304	13	317	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	3	–	3	17	1	18	–	–	–	17	1	18
Canada	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Chad	1 097	13	1 110	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
China	388	14	402	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	123	–	123	11	1	12	–	–	–	11	1	12
Democratic Republic of the Congo	–	–	–	5	1	6	–	–	–	5	1	6
Denmark	18	1	19	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Egypt	63	–	63	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
El Salvador	87	4	91	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	1	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland	4	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
France	18	–	18	5	–	5	–	–	–	5	–	5
Gambia	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	7	1	8	7	–	7	–	–	–	7	–	7
Ghana	214	–	214	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Guinea	232	–	232	4	1	5	–	–	–	4	1	5
Guinea-Bissau	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Indonesia	37	2	39	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan	1	–	1	3	–	3	–	–	–	3	–	3
Kenya	3	1	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	42	4	46	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Madagascar	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Mauritania	6	–	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal	170	4	174	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Netherlands	452	22	474	18	6	24	–	–	–	18	6	24
Niger	854	5	859	8	1	9	–	–	–	8	1	9
Nigeria	155	25	180	2	–	2	119	20	139	121	20	141
Norway	18	3	21	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	45	4	49	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Romania	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rwanda	–	–	–	1	–	1	14	–	14	15	–	15
Senegal	662	2	664	11	2	13	273	2	275	284	4	288
Sierra Leone	3	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	226	17	243	1	2	3	–	–	–	1	2	3
Switzerland	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Togo	917	18	935	4	–	4	140	–	140	144	–	144
Tunisia	–	–	–	10	–	10	–	–	–	10	–	10
Turkey	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United States of America	10	–	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Yemen	7	–	7	9	–	9	–	–	–	9	–	9
Total	**8 875**	**168**	**9 043**	**189**	**18**	**207**	**826**	**22**	**848**	**1 015**	**40**	**1 055**



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